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UNDERSTANDING THE KEY DETERMINANTS OF  
RETAIL SUCCESS 
 
Efua Obeng, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2013 
 
 A few years ago I was asked to purchase a $200 shoe to fulfill my duty as a bridesmaid. 
As a doctoral student spending that much money on a shoe was unreasonable, so I was 
determined to find and purchase this shoe cheaper. I found a boutique that sold the shoe 
relatively inexpensively, but would not have my size in stock for a few weeks. However, when I 
returned, the boutique was out of business. I continued my search by calling two national 
retailers but here again faced obstacles; in both cases I was told that the shoe could only be 
purchased online because the retailers were limiting in-store assortments. I was ultimately forced 
to purchase the shoe for $200.  
 Although this shopping experience ended sub-optimally (I had to pay $200 for a shoe), it 
exposed me to some important retail trends which had previously eluded me. I saw a local 
retailer go out of business in a matter of weeks and also witnessed two seemingly dominant 
national retailers communicate that they were in fact struggling to remain competitive. But more 
than anything, this experience sparked my interest in retail competition. I wanted to know if the 
retail cues I observed were a result of poor macroeconomic conditions, idiosyncratic to the 
Pittsburgh market, or reflective of the industry as an aggregate.  
 From preliminary research I learned that retailers have found it increasingly difficult to 
survive, let alone thrive since the 1970s (e.g. Basker 2007, Jia 2006, Neumann 2005, and 
Neumann 2008). Not only are retailers facing increased pressures from manufacturers in the 
form of disintermediation, but there are pressures from the internet in the form of lowered search 
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costs, from new entrants like box stores and retail chains, and from consumers to provide more 
value at lower price points (e.g. (Jia 2006; Neumann 2005; Basker 2007). Despite this mounting 
competitive intensity, retailers continue to face pressures from shareholders to increase their 
market exposure and revenue earning potential (e.g. Barney 1991, Capron and Hulland 1999, 
Dutta et al. 1999, Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999, and Makadok 2001).  
 My dissertation studies the inconsistency between shareholders’ expectations and 
retailers’ experiences in two essays. By identifying the key drivers of retail success and 
explaining how competitive overlap impacts retail incumbents' ability to compete against new 
entrants, my dissertation not only provides managers with actionable insights but advances the 
marketing field’s theoretical understandings of retail competition.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 Retailers are finding it increasingly difficult to survive and thrive in today’s cut-throat 
competitive environment. Singh et al. (2006, p. 457) summarize this phenomenon by stating the 
following: “Rapid growth of alternative retail formats, in the form of mass discounters, 
wholesale clubs, and supercenters, has transformed not only the competitive structure of the 
industry, but also the way in which consumers shop.” Despite this increased competitive 
intensity, few studies have identified the keys to retail success. My dissertation fills this gap by 
(1) explaining how retail advantage is built and (2) documenting the effects of competitive 
overlap between retail players.  
 My first essay uses an induction-based approach to identify the sources of retail 
advantage. I review pertinent literature, interview qualified retail managers, and use archival 
records to identify twelve capabilities vital to retail success. I find that durable retail advantage is 
driven by deploying systems of interdependent capabilities and appreciating capabilities’ 
differential importance. I synthesize this research into a framework to provide managers with 
additional insights as they develop company resources.  
 My second essay is an empirical piece which studies the differential effectiveness of 
emulation and differentiation as competitive strategies. Strategic direction is seen as a 
continuum, a relationship I capture by introducing the notion of “strategic service orientation 
(SSO).” I examine how a firm’s SSO impacts its sales after new competitors arrive and the 
effects of pertinent SSO moderators. Results show that emulation-based services best protect 
incumbents from both new Wal-Marts and new upscale stores. However, as the number of 
competitors near the new entrant increases, differentiation-based services become more relevant. 
Importantly, the incumbent’s format impacts its ability to compete and how it should compete.  
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 Taken together, my dissertation provides unique and valuable insights into retail 
competition. It is hoped that my research not only has unparalleled pragmatic implications, but 
theoretical ones as well. These implications will come clearer in the following sections.  
1.1 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY I  
 
 The first paper in my dissertation is a conceptual piece modeled after Kohli and 
Jaworski’s (1990) seminal work on market orientation. I follow this model because like these 
authors I inductively derive insights from qualitative sources. I specifically interviewed qualified 
retail managers, reviewed retail leaders’ archival records, and reviewed the capabilities and retail 
literatures to identify twelve capabilities vital to retail success.  
 I also find that that these capabilities are differentially important and their value creation 
paths vary. For example, primary capabilities are vital to retail success and the foundation on 
which retail advantages are built; primary capabilities are sufficient in themselves to produce 
competitive advantage. These capabilities are unique in that they are very knowledge-intensive, 
so that successfully leveraging them depends on firm-specific demands and skills (Barney 1989 
and Capron and Hulland 1998). For retailers these primary competitive drivers are market 
sensing, customer service, buying ability, and brand management. Comparatively, secondary 
capabilities play supportive and facilitative roles, and build upon primary capabilities to create 
value. Thus, they have an indirect impact (working through primary capabilities) on retail 
performance. The four secondary retail capabilities are divestment management, risk 
management, inter-functional partnerships, and novel shopping experience.  
 The third group—fluid capabilities--shares properties with primary and secondary 
capabilities. A fluid capability’s value-creation path depends on external market factors like 
stability in the external market environment, as well as changes in price structures, production 
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methods, and competitive structures (Lucas, Jr. and Gresham 1985 and Jaworski 1988). 
Effectively managing fluid capabilities requires that retailers understand when and how their 
value-creation paths change, and adjust their emphasis accordingly. Four such capabilities exist 
in the retail context: supply chain operations, price-value relationship, property management, and 
IT skills.  
 Notably, retailers must consider the degree of complementarity when investing across 
primary and supportive capabilities. Although emphasizing primary capabilities leads to superior 
retail performance, investing in secondary and contingency capabilities that are interrelated with 
primary ones yields greater (and more sustainable) advantages. For example, supply chain 
operations enable retailers’ buying programs but have no effective impact on their brand 
management. So if the retailer’s goal is to improve its buying programs, then emphasizing supply 
chain is justified but if the goal is to improve its brand management system then emphasizing 
supply chain is unwarranted. 
 To advance this argument I identify groups or systems of complementary retail 
capabilities organized around the four primary capabilities. The secondary and fluid resources 
included in systems “enable” their associated primary capabilities.  
1.2 SYNOPSIS OF ESSAY II 
 
 Porter (1980, 1998) identifies differentiation and emulation as generic strategies firms 
can use to achieve competitive advantage. Differentiation allows firms to create a perception of 
exclusivity, charge premium prices, and ultimately create a highly defensible competitive 
position.  In contrast, emulation allows firms to piggy-back on competitors’ investments, learn 
from their mistakes, and identify competitive deficiencies that can be exploited (Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1998).  
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 The second essay in my dissertation tests the differential effectiveness of these 
competitive positions to understand which minimizes incumbents’ sales losses from new 
entrants. Although the terms “emulation” and “differentiation” imply strategic reaction, I use 
them to capture the degree of similarity and dissimilarity between competitor’s service offerings 
respectively.  
 I introduce the idea of strategic service orientation (SSO) to capture the relative 
emphasis firms place on services aimed at emulation versus those aimed at differentiation. Thus, 
firms’ service offerings lie along a continuum -- they can exclusively offer services that emulate 
or exclusively offer services that differentiate, or some combination of both. I determine a 
retailer’s SSO by subtracting the number of services aimed at differentiation from the number of 
services it offers aimed at emulation, and then divide this value by the total number of services 
offered by incumbent i relative to new entrant j at time t. 
 Through my analysis I show that emulation is superior to differentiation for incumbents 
competing against new entrants and is particularly effective when the new entrant is an upscale 
store. However, the importance of differentiation increases with competitive intensity. I find that 
the need to stand out overtakes the power of being a first-mover when there are at least twenty-
one retailers in an area. In the same sense, competitors within twelve miles of the new entrant 
should emphasize emulation but those outside of this radius are best served by operating unique 
competitive positions. Together these results suggest that retailers should assess the competitive 
nature of trading areas before deciding how to approach a new competitive threat.   
 I also estimate models to understand how the competitive positions work across different 
retail formats. These analyses make clear that vulnerability to new entrants is not uniform but 
instead depends on characteristics of the incumbent and characteristics of the new entrant. 
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Emulating is optimal for drug incumbents, and though emulation minimizes grocers’ sales losses 
from new Wal-Marts, differentiation is key when the new entrant is an upscale store. Finally, 
differentiation and emulation are equally ineffective at insulating discounters from new Wal-
Marts, but discounters should emphasize differentiation in the face of new upscale stores.  
1.3 CONTRIBUTION  
 
 Together, the essays in my dissertation provide a fuller perspective of retail competition. 
From a theoretical perspective I identify twelve capabilities that foster retail advantage, explicate 
each capability’s value-creation path, identify the systems of capabilities underlying sustained 
retail advantage, and explain how each of these systems works. My research also shows that 
retail advantage is driven by an understanding of how an incumbent's competitive position vis-à-
vis a new entrant’s impacts their ability to compete. This key result extends Gielens et al. (2008), 
Ailawadi et al. (2010), and comparable authors by identifying conditions where a high degree of 
competitive similarity is valuable. 
 Second, my dissertation provides retail managers with important, actionable insights. For 
example, I find that retailers rarely sustain advantages because managers attempt to develop 
multiple primary capabilities at once, treat capabilities as equally important, and/or emphasize 
individual resources instead of systems. Additionally, I show that failure to match a new 
entrant’s offering in the form of emulation highlights deficiencies in the incumbent’s strategy 
and ultimately encourages consumer switching at a high rate. And although emulation is superior 
to differentiation in an absolute sense, the importance of differentiation increases with 
competitive intensity and as proximity between competitors increases. Thus, retailers should 
assess the competitive nature of trading areas before deciding how to approach a new 
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competitive threat.  Importantly, the effectiveness of the competitive positions differs across 
incumbent format.  
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2.0 Essay I: Capability Systems and Retail Success 
 
“The retail store is a ubiquitous feature of the modern American economy. Over 15 million 
Americans, 11.3 percent of the work force, work in retail trade…While these figures provide an 
indication of the size of the industry, they do not capture the full impact of retailing on the 
American economy....This wide scope means changes in the sector have profound and immediate 
impacts on the entire American economy and populace.” 
~Neumann (2008) 
 
Although retailing is an integral component of the American economy, retailers are 
finding it increasingly difficult to survive – much less thrive (Basker 2007, Jia 2006, Neumann 
2005, and Neumann 2008). This difficulty can be attributed to growth in the number of discount 
stores and retail chains, increased emphasis on low price models, and increased pressures to 
invest in costly technologies (Jia 2006; Neumann 2005; Basker 2007). As a result of these 
changes, retail sales and gross margins have consistently fallen since 2007, with gross margins 
dropping more than ten percent between 2000 and 2010 (The 2009 Annual Retail Trade Report). 
In an environment of mounting competitive intensity, retailers face pressures from 
shareholders to increase market exposure and improve revenue earning potential. To address 
these pressures, retailers seek resources that can be leveraged to achieve competitive advantage 
by creating more value than competitors (i.e., Barney 1991, Capron and Hulland 1999, Dutta et 
al. 1999, Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999, and Makadok 2001). As Hulland et al. (2007, p.4) note: 
“The retailing industry can be characterized as brutally competitive and fast moving. In such a 
daunting operating environment, the search for a new source of competitive advantage is an 
ongoing quest.”  
Though researchers have attempted to provide retailers with actionable and usable 
insights, many still struggle to achieve competitive advantage. We argue that this disconnect 
exists because while some research asserts that industry-level characteristics make some 
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resources important and others less so (e.g., Capron and Hulland 1999; Day 1994; Teece et al. 
1997; Srivastava et al. 1998), little research has explored the sources of competitive advantage in 
the retail industry.  For example, it is unclear if property management is a primary performance 
driver in the retail industry in the same way that it is the diamond industry. Similarly, although 
personal selling is important in the business-to-business context, it is unclear if and how this 
resource works in the retail context. This gap in literature is puzzling, because the retail industry 
is so paramount in terms of size (employment and number of outlets) and because it performs a 
critical function linking consumers and manufacturers. 
To address this gap, we draw on archival records, conduct interviews with qualified retail 
managers, and review past work to identify important retailing capabilities and to explain each 
capability’s value-creation path. This approach allows us to resolve discrepancies between retail 
researchers and practitioners, and ultimately develop a framework to help guide retail managers’ 
decisions. As such, our research not only advances theoretical understanding of retail 
competition but also provides retail managers with actionable advice. It is important to note that 
the resources we identify may be valuable in other industries, but their effective combination into 
systems of capabilities is unique to retailers.  
We organize the remainder of this paper into five sections. We begin by describing our 
methodological approach, after which we summarize the traditional view of capabilities. The 
third section introduces a new typology of capabilities that details their value-creation paths and 
the fourth discusses complementarity between capabilities. We conclude by highlighting our 
main contributions and discussing the implications of our work. 
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2.1 INFORMATION SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
Though we study a very different issue than Kohli and Jaworski (1990), our study 
follows a similar methodological approach because, like them, we seek to build theory from 
diverse, qualitative data sources. We draw on managerial interviews and published literature, but 
also gain insights from archival data (e.g., company annual reports, quarterly earnings reports). 
These three data sources allow us to triangulate our findings and thereby draw robust insights.  
2.1.1 Literature Review  
 
 Much research has explored the importance of capabilities and firm performance. For 
example, one stream of research explains how capabilities produce competitive advantage (e.g. 
Barney 1991, Teece et al. 1997, Capron and Hulland 1999, Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999, and 
Makadok 2001). Researchers in this area have also identified contingencies that impact a 
resource’s value and its ability to increase firm performance. For example, Moorman and 
Slotegraaf (1999) argue that “…the value of capabilities is contingent on their effective 
deployment or use (p. 252).” A second set of research in this subject area identifies the 
capabilities driving different types of organizations. For example, consider Day (1994) and Dutta 
et al. (1999), who identify the capabilities unique to market oriented firms and those particularly 
important in high technology industries, respectively.  
Our paper is within the tradition established by this last group of works as we seek to 
identify the capabilities underlying retail advantages. Based on the literature we initially 
identified and defined ten capabilities vital to retail success. But because this literature is 
primarily descriptive and fails to explicate how capabilities produce competitive advantage, it 
serves as the foundation for the rest of our paper and identifies gaps requiring further 
clarification. 
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2.1.2 Field Interviews  
We interviewed fourteen senior retail managers to augment the information collected 
through our literature review. Specifically, we were looking for confirmation of some aspects of 
the existing perspective (e.g. Porter 1980) as well as an expansion of this view to reflect the 
peculiarities of the retailing context. The interviewees were held with retail managers and 
executives with at least regional-level managerial experience, including: Executive Vice 
Presidents, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), and regional managers. Four of the interviewees 
currently serve or served in the past on top retail management teams. The interviewees worked in 
seven companies across four American cities, in various functions. Four of those interviewed 
held marketing positions, while the remaining ten had expertise in strategic management, 
financial planning, and new product development. Care was taken to include personnel who 
worked at organizations of various sizes. Our sample specifically included sole proprietors, and 
managers from both multinational and regional chains. In two cases, interviews were cross-
functional within the same company. The interviews lasted about an hour. Follow up emails were 
sent to interviewees when clarification was needed. Because our sample “…reflects a diverse set 
of organizations, departments, and positions… [it] is well suited for obtaining a rich set of ideas 
and insights (Kohli and Jaworksi 1990, p. 2).”  
We began the interviews by introducing our research project and then administered 
research protocols based on the interviewee’s sector of expertise. The protocols provided 
guidelines for interviews, but permitted deviations when clarification was necessary. For 
example, deviations were needed to explain questions, expound on concepts, provide examples, 
and generally provide more insight than otherwise.  
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Questions in the protocol were broken into three groups. The first set of questions sought 
to develop more comprehensive definitions of capabilities and identify key retailing capabilities 
not already studied in the literature.  The second set of questions was designed to understand the 
relative emphasis retailers place on different capabilities and how capabilities work together. For 
example, interviewees were asked to identify the primary, secondary, and fluid capabilities and 
explain their reasoning. These questions allow us to determine the differential importance of the 
retail capabilities for each firm. From these questions we also gained a better understanding of 
how the capabilities identified in the literature impact retail value, and how each can be 
leveraged to create competitive advantage. The last set of questions was more process-focused 
than the others. Here, the goal was to identify the processes need to convert capabilities into 
sources of sustained advantage.  Refer to Appendix A for a copy of the protocols. 
2.1.3 Archival Records 
Finally, we used archival records — annual reports and quarterly earnings conference 
calls, MSN Money, and published articles — to confirm, and augment the findings from the 
interviews. We analyzed archival records for the home improvement and apparel sectors, sectors 
that seemingly have little in common because they are at opposite ends of the retail spectrum, 
because commonalities between them should reflect industry-wide trends. Within these sectors, 
we focused on the decisions of the firms with the highest sales as identified by The National 
Retail Federation’s 2011 Top 100 Retailers, leaving us with two home improvement firms—
Home Depot and Lowe’s--and four apparel firms—Macy’s, JCPenney, Nordstrom, and Sears. 
We focused on firms’ decisions between 2000 and 2011 because this period was marked by a 
variety of macroeconomic conditions (i.e. periods of growth and downturn) and extensive 
technological growth. Importantly, although Wal-Mart is the world’s most dominant retailer we 
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believe its size, supply chain strength, assortment, and resources are atypical, rendering it an 
outlier (though in a positive way) in the retail industry  (Ailawadi et al. 2010). Specifically, 
though competitors may attempt to copy Wal-Mart’s strategy most lack the resources needed to 
successfully do so.  
2.2 RETAILING CAPABILITIES: A TRADITIONAL VIEW 
We define resources as “assets and capabilities that are available and useful in detecting 
and responding to market opportunities or threats” (Sanchez et al. 1996).  Together, assets and 
capabilities describe the set of resources available to the firm.  Assets represent anything tangible 
or intangible the firm can use to create, produce, and/or offer its products (goods or services) to a 
market.  As such, assets can serve as inputs to a process, or as the outputs of a process 
(Srivastava et al. 1998; Teece et al.  1997).  In contrast, capabilities transform inputs into outputs 
of greater worth (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Capron and Hulland 1999; Sanchez et al. 1996) 
and have been found to be particularly important drivers of success (e.g. Teece et al. 1997, 
Vorhies et al. 1999, Rosenzweig et al. 2003, and Tsai and Shih 2004). Capabilities can include 
skills, such as technical or managerial ability, or processes, like systems development or 
integration.  
Through the literature review we pinpointed ten capabilities that are important to 
retailers. The interviewees and archival records provide further evidence of their importance to 
retail success. These capabilities are identified and defined in Table 1. Information for this table 
primarily comes from previous academic research, but is supplemented with insights from our 
managerial interviews. Importantly, the interviewees identify and define two additional 
capabilities (not shown in Table 1) — risk and divestment management –as being critical to 
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retail success. Thus, we recognize twelve capabilities that are vital to retail advantage. After 
briefly describing Table 1, we discuss the two newly identified capabilities in more detail. 
Table 1.Traditional View of Capabilities 
 
Source of competitive 
advantage 
Capability Traditional description Informants’ additions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differentiation-Based 
Advantage 
Market sensing* The “processes for gathering, 
interpreting, and using market 
information (Day 1994).” 
Poorly anticipating market 
fluctuations forces retailers to play 
“catch up” and erodes previous 
competitive advantages. 
Customer service* The ability to provide superior 
customer service has been found to 
have a strong link to increased 
overall firm performance (e.g., 
Anderson et al. 1994; Bolton 1998). 
Accessibility to customers and a 
customer-friendly atmosphere are 
particularly important to retailers. 
Brand 
management* 
Firms must balance competing 
brands and maximize the profit 
associated with each (e.g., Capron 
and Hulland 1999; Srivastava et al. 
1998). 
Firms must create a unique DNA – a 
brand filter – for each of its brands in 
order to minimize brand overlap and 
successfully target distinct segments.  
Novel shopping 
experience 
It is achieved by combining unique 
formats and atmospherics with an 
element of surprise (Pearce 1989).  
Retailers must utilize unique elements 
and delivering surprise must be done 
in a way that is consistent with the 
retailer’s overall image. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost-Based Advantage 
Property 
management 
The ability to find high profit retail 
locations and invest in high-quality 
real estate while optimizing 
consumers’ convenience. 
Property management is supported by 
anticipating future development 
trends, co-locating with other firms, 
and purchasing real estate in close 
proximity to Big Box stores, and 
recoup abnormally high profit margins 
by selling premium properties. 
Supply Chain 
Operations 
Wal-Mart is widely recognized as a 
leader in this area, having created 
regional distribution centers to 
encourage cost efficient logistics and 
transportation operations. 
Online distribution methods allow 
firms to avoid warehousing costs and 
automation allows firms to eliminate 
employee costs, but retailers must 
keep traditional distribution systems. 
IT skills Information technology (IT) skills 
refer to the provision of efficient and 
cost effective information systems 
(IS). 
As retail sales migrate to the online 
world, IT skills are likely to play an 
increasingly important role in driving 
sales and ensuring firm profitability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balance-Based 
Advantage 
Price-value 
relationship 
 
Firms must maximize the value 
provided to their consumers and 
charge the fairest prices, while 
remaining profitable. 
Retailers must charge the fairest 
though not necessarily the lowest 
prices. Retailers must manipulate 
consumers’ quality perceptions. 
Inter-functional 
partnerships 
These partnerships span gaps 
between functions, reduce “tunnel 
vision,” and encourage collaboration. 
Inter-functional partnerships promote 
efficiencies of scale, allow retailers to 
assess strategic shifts, and encourage 
creativity. 
Buying ability* Buying ability allows retailers to 
compete by offering shoppers 
unique, dominant, and consistent 
assortments of goods (Frigo 2002). 
This hinges on the ability to gain 
control and efficiencies, negotiate for 
advertising money, and partner with 
vendors to share in markdowns. 
  *Indicates potentially strong sources of advantage that rarely achieve this level because they are not well understood by managers.  
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2.2.1 The Traditional View  
Building from Porter (1980), Table 1 identifies three mutually exclusive approaches to 
achieving retail advantage. The first of these approaches, differentiation, is aimed at “...creating 
something that is perceived industry-wide as being unique (Porter 1980; p. 37).” The literature 
identifies market sensing, customer service, brand management, and novel shopping experience 
as sources of differentiation-based advantage (e.g. Pearce 1989, Day 1994, Frigo 2002, Hulland 
et al. 2007). For example, a novel shopping experience creates a perception of exclusivity and 
encourages abnormally high profit margins (Pearce 1989), and market sensing allows firms to 
build unique knowledge stores and develop more sustainable programs than otherwise (Day 
1994).  
Comparatively, cost leadership requires that firms emphasize low costs and maintain 
“…quality, service, and other [pertinent] areas (Dess and Davis 1984, p. 469).” Distribution and 
logistics operations, property management, and information technology (IT) skills are potential 
sources of cost advantage in the retail sector (e.g. Barney 1991, Bharadwaj 2000, and Wade and 
Hulland 2004). The ability to streamline the value chain, minimize stock-outs, reduce inventory 
costs, and avoid persistent costs through IT skills is likely to be an important precursor to 
superior cost-based performance (Barney 1991). According to the interviewees, retailers with 
strong supply chain programs are largely able to eliminate costs associated with warehousing, 
“middle-men,” sources of slack, and charge abnormally low prices.  
The third set of competitive drivers involves balancing offsetting forces. Balance is 
marked by the ability to correctly weigh competitive forces, and to respond accordingly by 
emphasizing the right set of capabilities. The balance-based competitive drivers are price-value 
relationship, inter-functional partnerships, and buying ability. Retailers that consistently buy 
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merchandise with consumers’ demands in mind and simultaneously maintain the mix of 
“traditional” products for which they are noted achieve balance-based advantages (Frigo 2002). 
The managers’ experiences suggest that partnerships marked by connectivity, unified and clear 
strategic positions, and checks and balances promote more efficient operations than otherwise. 
These partnerships work by promoting efficiencies of scale, allowing retailers to assess strategic 
shifts, and encouraging more creativity than otherwise.  
Importantly, our informants think four of the capabilities—buying ability, customer 
service, market sensing, and brand management—identified in Table 1 are potentially strong 
sources of advantage but rarely achieve this level because they are not well understood by 
managers. For example, they argue that few retailers emphasize supply chain initiatives to 
promote their buying programs. Strong supply chain relationships allow retailers to increase 
operational efficiencies, negotiate for advertising money, partner with channel members to share 
in markdowns, and ultimately enable buying advantages.  
Also, consider customer service. The informants agree that retailers often invest in 
superficial customer service programs and are thus largely unable to achieve service-based 
advantages. For instance, although JCPenney consistently has the highest customer satisfaction 
scores among department stores (JCPenney 2009 Annual Report), it does not appear to have a 
service-based advantage. This disparity exists because JCPenney relies on inventory 
management, employee training, and comparable programs that are easily observed, imitated, 
and substituted to advance its service initiatives (JCPenney 2009 Annual Report). And although 
some retailers view showrooming—visiting brick and mortar stores before purchasing online—
as a threat, it appears that firms can embrace this trend to improve their service levels. It 
specifically appears that showrooming engages consumers across multiple channels to promote 
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service advantage (Placed 2013). Thus, the difficulty lies in executing unique, complex, and 
valuable service programs and turning potential threats into sources of advantage. 
Market sensing poses a similar challenge. Here again, retailers often invest in research 
and data collection capabilities, and comparable market sensing activities. While these activities 
are valuable, it appears that the key to a sensing advantage is correctly anticipating market 
changes. According to one manager, failure to anticipate market fluctuations forces retailers to 
play “catch up” and erodes previous competitive advantages. Her firm failed to anticipate the 
2009 economic downturn, and was forced to drastically slash prices, reorganize personnel, and 
reposition its products to obtain marginal profitability. In response to this poor preparation, the 
firm has subsequently installed new safe-guards to ensure that it better monitors market demand 
drivers in the future. 
The final source of this performance gap is brand management. According to the 
interviewees, few retailers create unique DNA filters for each of their brands to minimize brand 
overlap and effectively target different segments.  While some degree of overlap is inherent 
between brands, creating unique DNAs minimizes it. By actively monitoring consumers’ 
preferences and adjusting their brand assortments accordingly, retailers can best maximize the 
profits associated with each brand.  
2.2.2 Additional Capabilities 
 
2.2.2.1 Risk management. Though retailers face various types of risks, those interviewed 
believe that effectively managing fat-tail risks
1
 is especially important. This sentiment is 
supported by Huisman et al. (1998; p.47), who state that the need to manage fat-tail risks “...has 
                                                          
1
 The term “fat-tail risks” refers to a hazard associated with abnormally negative financial dangers (e.g. Huisman et 
al. 1998). 
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grown in response to the higher volatility and instability on global financial markets, 
compounded by the enormous growth in trading activity and international exposure.” Examples 
of such fat-tail events include supply chain disruptions, regulatory changes, natural disasters, and 
other non-operating risks.  What distinguishes these events from others is that they are relatively 
sporadic, not easily predicted or readily controlled by the firm, and are associated with 
disproportionately large financial losses.  
Additional research indicates that increasing capital costs and discount rates inhibit stable 
supply chain operations and decrease the net present value of cash flows (Srivstava et al. 1998). 
These factors in turn decrease shareholder value and increase the risks of future cash flows, 
making it relatively more difficult for firms to secure money for future projects. Although 
Srivstava et al. (1998) solely relate fat-tail risks to supply chain operations, these risks are 
relevant to all retail resources. Some of the risks associated with fat-tail events were 
acknowledged by Macy’s in its 2010 annual report (p. 7-8): 
“Reduced sales from extreme or prolonged unseasonable weather conditions could 
adversely affect the Company’s business. In addition, natural disasters such as hurricanes, 
tornadoes and earthquakes, or a combination of these or other factors, could severely 
damage or destroy one or more of the Company’s stores or warehouses located in the 
affected areas, thereby disrupting the Company’s business operations.” 
 
Though fat-tail events are unpredictable, firms can leverage marketing resources to 
minimize their effects. For example, Doyle (2001) and Gruca and Rego (2005) believe that firms 
can use capabilities to establish strong customer bases that at least partially insulate them from 
the effects of fat-tail events. Quality risk management facilitates efficient responses to changes in 
the macro-environment, promotes stability, and subsequently allows firms to achieve competitive 
advantages through differentiation.   
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2.2.2.2 Divestment management. A second capability uncovered during our interviews is 
divestment management -- the ability to get rid of unprofitable ventures. This capability does not 
apply to marginally unprofitable relationships or relationships that have been unprofitable for a 
short-time, but to those that have large, persistent, and detrimental performance implications 
(e.g. Garrett 1987, Wright and Ferris 19976). While acquisitions of regional competitors in the 
early to mid-2000’s increased Macy’s visibility, some of these purchases resulted in duplicate 
locations (i.e. stores within a few miles of one another) and subsequently cannibalized the 
Macy’s brand. To address this problem, the retailer closed eighty duplicate stores in 2005, an 
additional sixty stores in 2006, and converted the remaining duplicates to Bloomingdale’s 
apparel stores or Macy’s furniture galleries. These initiatives resulted in a $445 million gain 
between 2005 and 2008 (Macy’s 2007 Annual Report).  
According to our managers, few retailers use divestments to achieve competitive 
advantage. This underuse can be attributed to various factors. First, it is relatively difficult to 
determine the degree of divestment needed to improve performance. Consider Sears, which has 
largely been unable to divest its unprofitable acquisition of K-Mart (which occurred in 2005). It 
is unclear whether the corporation should completely close all K-Mart stores, reposition these 
stores, or maintain stores only in those areas where duplication is minimal. Further, the source of 
competitive disadvantage is not always clear. Does K-Mart’s poor performance stem from its 
poor supply chain processes, location strategy, low brand equity, or a combination of these and 
other factors? Retailers are also hesitant because divestitures tend to produce short-term losses 
(e.g. Montgomery and Thomas 1988, and Wright and Ferris 1997), losses that relatively few 
firms have the capital to absorb and even fewer managers have incentive to undertake. And 
finally, divestments have lagged effects that are not easily captured by stocks and other 
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performance metrics (Montgomery and Thomas 1988).  Retailers that divest in key areas can 
nevertheless increase their efficiency and ultimately achieve sustainable cost advantages. 
2.3 A REVISED TYPLOGY OF RETAIL CAPABILITIES 
 
While a classification system can help guide managers’ decisions, the interviewees argue 
that the “traditional view” fails to fully explicate how capabilities produce competitive 
advantage—achieve more value than rivals. They instead proposed that retail capabilities can be 
grouped into three categories — primary, secondary, and fluid — each of which is associated 
with a unique value-creation path. This new typology was clarified, expanded, and refined 
through iterative discussions with our informants, and is described in more detail below (and 
summarized in Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
             
             
              
 
Figure 1. Relating the Differential Impacts of Capabilities to Superior Retail Performance 
 
Secondary Capabilities 
 Divestment management 
 Inter-functional  partnerships  
 Novel shopping experience  
 Risk management 
 
Competitive 
Advantage 
Primary Capabilities 
 Brand 
management 
 Buying ability 
 Customer service  
 Market sensing 
 
Fluid Capabilities 
 Distribution and logistics 
 IT skills 
 Price-value relationship 
 Property management skills 
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2.3.1 Primary Capabilities 
  Primary capabilities are the resources vital to firm success and are the foundation on 
which competitive advantages are built. These externally oriented capabilities work by 
anticipating market requirements, creating durable customer relationships, understanding 
competitors, and exploring new opportunities to achieve competitive differentiation (e.g., 
Ozsomer and Gencturk 2003; Wade and Hulland 2004).  
The informants identify four such capabilities in the retail industry — market sensing, 
brand management, customer service, and buying ability and their assertions are confirmed 
through archival records. For example, Macy’s 2010 Annual Report cites customer service and 
buying programs as its primary growth engines. Home Depot’s primary goal is to provide 
innovative products at great value by developing key brand partnerships (Home Depot 2007 
Annual Report).  And Sears’ “…success depends on our [its] ability to differentiate ourselves 
[themselves] from our [their] competitors with respect to …a quality assortment of available 
merchandise and superior customer service. We [They] must also successfully respond to our 
customers’ changing tastes (Sears 2011 Annual Report, p.7).”  
Primary capabilities are unique in that they are knowledge-intensive, so that successfully 
leveraging them depends on firm-specific demands and skills (Barney 1989 and Capron and 
Hulland 1998). Consider market sensing, a capability that describes the acquisition and 
dissemination of relevant information (Day 1994, Kohli and Jaworski 1990). The information 
crucial to Bloomingdales success is largely different from that important to JC Penney’s since 
these retailers target distinct segments. Bloomingdales may not be able to capitalize on direct 
competitors’ market sensing activities because they may have different strategic orientations, 
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organizational cultures, priorities, and information needs. Srivastava et al. (1998, p.5) best 
summarize the knowledge-intensive nature of primary capabilities:  
“Intellectual market-based assets are the types of knowledge a firm possesses…The 
content or elements of knowledge include facts, perceptions, beliefs, assumptions, and 
projections. The content of each type and its sources vary greatly from one to another. 
Thus, a firm may develop projections of the way its industry will evolve so that it knows 
how it will react ... Or a firm may develop over time unique facts, beliefs, and 
assumptions about its customers' tastes, manufacturing processes, or proclivities to 
respond in certain ways to promotion, sales, and pricing moves.”  
 
Because primary capabilities are very knowledge-intensive, competitors cannot easily 
identify the source of competitive advantage, making it difficult to copy and transfer them across 
firms. A similar argument was presented by Barney (1991), who argues that when causal 
ambiguity exists “…it is not clear that the resources that can be described are the same resources 
that generate a sustained competitive advantage, or whether that advantage reflects some other 
non-described resource (Barney 1991, p. 109).”  Based on this discussion we argue that primary 
capabilities are necessary and sufficient to achieve superior retail performance. Formally:  
Proposition 1: Four primary capabilities-market sensing, brand management, 
customer service, and buying ability- are vital to retail success and 
can be leveraged to achieve superior competitive position. 
 
Paradoxically, the archival records indicate that advantages from primary capabilities are 
rarely sustainable. Our review of archival records specifically indicates that emphasizing primary 
capabilities often leads to superior short-run performance, but this advantage rarely if ever 
persists over the long-run. This gap exists because retailers often spread investments across 
multiple primary capabilities, rather than concentrating investments in a single capability or a 
subset. Such a strategy is faulty because few retailers have the organizational slack needed to 
support such widespread activity and remain profitable. In addition, the interviewees believe that 
capabilities developed simultaneously receive relatively less investment and attention, are 
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subsequently of poorer quality than those developed in sequence, and ultimately produce lower 
than expected returns.  Basically, retailers are best served by investing disproportionately large 
amounts in one or two primary capabilities and maintaining status-quo investments in others. We 
therefore posit that:  
Proposition 2: All other things equal, retailers that focus their resources in a 
subset of primary capabilities will outperform those that 
equally spread resources across all primary capabilities.   
 
2.3.2 Secondary Capabilities 
 As the name suggests, secondary capabilities play supplementary roles. Primary 
capabilities are critical to all retailers, but the emphasis placed on secondary capabilities largely 
depends on a firm’s strategic orientation and niche. For example, Nordstrom has used its novel 
shopping experience to create a service-based advantage, but this capability is relatively 
unimportant to lower-tier retailers where customer service expectations are considerably lower; 
customers’ perceptions of brands are at least in part determined by the type of retail outlet 
(Kalwani et al. 1990). And although large firms must emphasize inter-functional coordination, 
this capability is less important to smaller firms where there is little to no functional separation 
and/or few people are responsible for decision-making (Eisenberg et al. 1998). Thus, secondary 
capabilities are only essential to a subset of retailers.  
It is important to recognize that in themselves, secondary capabilities do not add value to 
the firm let alone produce competitive advantage (see Wade and Hulland 2004 for a similar 
discussion in the IS context). Secondary capabilities play such minor roles because they 
emphasize firms’ internal capabilities and largely discount external factors like competitive 
intensity and technological growth. So though secondary capabilities may positively impact 
baseline performance, in themselves these capabilities do not promote superior competitive 
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positions. For instance, though inter-functional partnerships encourage synergy and efficiency 
(Ross et al. 1996 and Bharadwaj 2000), these advantages cannot be achieved in the absence of 
key information like that acquired through market sensing activities. And a novel shopping 
experience is fruitless in the absence of quality customer service programs. Basically, secondary 
capabilities serve supportive and facilitative functions, build upon and integrate existing 
resources, improve the efficiency of primary capabilities, and interact with primary capabilities 
to produce superior competitive positions. In addition to inter-functional partnerships and novel 
shopping experience, risk and divestment management also serve secondary functions.  Per this 
discussion it is clear that primary capabilities perfectly mediate the secondary capabilities-
competitive advantage relationship; in the absence of primary capabilities secondary capabilities 
do not lead to competitive advantage.   
Recognizing that secondary capabilities do not directly lead to competitive advantage, we 
nevertheless argue that an appreciation of them leads to stronger competitive advantage than 
strictly focusing on primary capabilities. Our research specifically finds that primary capabilities 
have stronger and more durable performance implications when leveraged in conjunction with 
specific underlying secondary capabilities. Consider customer service, a primary capability (e.g. 
Anderson et al. 1994, Bolton 1998, Frigo 2002, and Homburg et al. 2002). The interviewees 
believe that this capability’s impact is stronger and deeper when coupled with novel shopping 
experience and other secondary capabilities that enrich it. Therefore, complementary primary 
and secondary capabilities work together to promote retail success, an idea we develop in a 
subsequent section.   
This discussion makes a few things clear. First, primary capabilities are necessary to 
succeed in the retail industry but secondary capabilities by themselves are not; secondary 
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capabilities are insufficient to achieve a superior retail position. Second, and equally important, 
is the idea that secondary capabilities “…exert their influence on the firm through 
complementary relationships with other firm assets and capabilities (Wade and Hulland, p. 109)” 
and primary capabilities in particular. By augmenting the functionality of primary capabilities, 
secondary resources promote retail advantage. Thus, as this discussion makes clear, secondary 
capabilities play indirect value creation roles. Building from this we argue:   
Proposition 3: Four secondary capabilities — divestment management, risk 
management, inter-functional partnerships, and novel shopping 
experience — in themselves are not vital to retail success and 
interact with primary capabilities to produce superior competitive 
position.  
 
2.3.3 Fluid Capabilities 
 A third group of capabilities – fluids-- share properties of both primary and secondary 
capabilities. A fluid capability’s value creation depends on stability in the external market 
environment (e.g., rate of economic growth, degree of technological change), as well as changes 
in price structures, production methods, and competitive structures (Lucas, Jr. and Gresham 1985 
and Jaworski 1988). Effectively managing fluid capabilities requires that retailers understand 
how and when their value-creation paths change. Take for instance property management, a 
capability whose value is high (low) in strong (weak) economies (e.g. Holland et al. 1999 and 
Horrigan 2009). According to our interviewees, retail leaders acquire cheap, prime properties 
during poor economic periods and resell them for premium prices during stronger periods. Thus, 
property management can lead to superior performance during economic booms but merely 
serves a supportive function in weak economic periods.  
In the same vein, IT skills readily become obsolete when technological advances are 
drastic but remain valuable when such changes are minimal. This effect is obvious among book 
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retailers, where IT has shifted emphasis from physical to electronic reading sources and has 
completely redefined the industry. Ben Austen, a columnist for Bloomsberg Businessweek, 
explains this effect nicely by stating the following:  
“Amazon was launched in 1995, and Barnes & Noble responded with its own website 
two years later. It took Borders another year to get started online, and the venture quickly 
lost tens of millions of dollars. In 2001, Borders made a deal with Amazon to run all of 
its online business—a partnership, in retrospect, that comes across as tragically 
shortsighted…Amazingly, Borders wouldn’t end the Amazon deal and launch its own 
website until 2008.”  
 
Finally, the informants believe that the price-value relationship and distribution and 
logistics are disproportionately more important during periods of economic downturn.  They 
specifically argue that effectively balancing price and value can be a source of competitive 
advantage in weak economies when consumers’ real income and willingness to pay are relatively 
low, and price sensitivity is heightened (Blade and Parkin 2004, Lamb et al. 2011). 
Unfortunately, few retailers have the capital and slack needed to successfully deploy such 
programs in weak economies. In the same vein, retailers often face increasing pressures to cut 
costs by increasing the efficacy of their supply chain programs in weaker economic periods. This 
is not to say that logistics is unimportant during periods of economic growth, but instead that the 
marginal benefit received from this capability is sufficient to produce a competitive advantage in 
weaker economies.  
From the above discussion, it is clear that in some instances fluid capabilities directly 
lead to competitive advantage, but in others they serve secondary and supportive roles. 
Effectively managing this dynamic requires that retailers are aware of how and when their value-
creation paths change. Distribution and logistics and the price-value relationship are 
disproportionately more important in weak economic times, property management is a primary 
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performance driver in strong economic periods, and the importance of IT skills depends on the 
degree of technological change.  When technological changes are radical, IT skills become 
outdated faster and vice versa. Thus, the degree to which a retailer should develop fluid 
capabilities depends on external market factors:  
Proposition 4a: Four fluid capabilities—supply chain operations, price  
value relationship, property management, IT skills--exist in the  
retailing industry. 
 
Proposition 4b: Supply chain operations and the price-value relationship directly  
lead to competitive advantage in weak economic periods, but must  
interact with primary capabilities to produce competitive  
advantage in strong ones; this effect flips for property  
management.  
 
Proposition 4c: IT skills directly lead to competitive advantage when the degree  
of technological growth is fast, but must interact with primary  
capabilities to produce competitive advantage when technological  
growth is slow.  
 
Based on this discussion it is clear that firms must actively monitor fluid capabilities and 
the external market, and adjust emphasis accordingly. This is best done by maintaining at least 
status-quo investments in all fluid capabilities, as they provide the foundation needed to 
efficiently convert fluid capabilities to primary ones. Without such flexibility, retailers either 
over or underestimate the value received from fluid capabilities, ultimately leading to 
underperformance. Teece et al.’s (1997) path dependency model presents a comparable 
argument.   
2.4 COMPLEMENTARITY OF CAPABILITIES 
Though capabilities are differentially important, we do not believe that a universal 
approach to managing primary, secondary, or fluid capabilities exists. Instead, retailers may be 
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equally successful by emphasizing different combinations of capabilities. This variation can be 
attributed to numerous factors including retailers’ existing resources, employees’ knowledge, the 
competitive environment, differences in target markets, and different strategic orientations.  
Despite these company-specific idiosyncrasies, we believe that retailers must consider the 
degree of complementarity or fit when deploying capabilities. Porter (1996) identifies and 
describes three types of fit. He describes first-order fit as strategic consistency across functions 
and business units, and how resources are used. For example, if a firm adopts a high-cost 
philosophy this strategy should be supported by all of its functions and its resource deployment 
strategy should support this initiative as well (Porter 1996). Such consistency makes it easier to 
communicate, implement, and execute the high-cost strategy, but has no effective impact on the 
strategy itself.  
Second-order fit occurs when activities and functions are not only consistent but reinforce 
one another. Consider novelty, which uses unique retail formats and atmospherics to achieve an 
element of surprise (Pearce 1989) and enhance the customer’s shopping experience to encourage 
superior customer service. However, novelty does not support information gathering, 
interpretation, or other market sensing activities. So while novelty exhibits second-order fit with 
customer service, it does not have a comparable relationship with market sensing.  
Finally, optimization of effort builds upon second-order fit by minimizing redundancy 
and effort to achieve operational efficiency. This third-level of fit is often achieved by efficiently 
designing products, coordinating information exchange within the company and between supply 
chain members (Porter 1996). The Gap optimizes its buying and supply-chain efforts “…by 
restocking its selection of basic clothing almost daily out of three warehouses, thereby 
minimizing the need to carry large in-store inventories (Porter, p. 72).”  
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Though Porter (1996) identifies various types of fit, he argues that a high degree of fit 
uniformly promotes competitive advantage. Zhu (p. 11, 2004) summarizes this effect nicely by 
stating the following:  “Complementarity represents an enhancement of resource value and arises 
when a resource produces greater returns in the presence of another resource than by itself.” The 
advantage stemming from first-order fit is rather rudimentary; consistency across capabilities 
ensures that existing advantages are not eroded and that other activities have cumulative effects. 
Such simplicity leads to short-term, rather than sustained competitive advantage. But in the case 
of second-order and operational fit, capabilities enable and augment one another and in doing so 
promote superior competitive positions over the long-run. A firm’s ultimate goal is to leverage 
systems exhibiting third-order fit because they are the most sophisticated and complex, and 
ultimately lead to the strongest advantage.  
Per this discussion, it is clear that the difficulty lies in deploying the correct capabilities. 
Since primary capabilities are the pillars of competitive advantage firms must deploy supportive 
capabilities that provide an effective foundation for their chosen primary capability or 
capabilities. Our research indicates that simultaneously deploying systems of complementary 
capabilities encourages investment and operational efficiencies, lowers costs, and ultimately 
produces competitive advantage (Porter 1996, Zhu 2004). Thus, retailers that (1) identify which 
secondary and fluid capabilities support their primary capabilities of interest and (2) 
subsequently deploy these capabilities together will (3) outperform their peers. Formally 
Proposition 5:  When complementarity is high, secondary and fluid 
capabilities boost returns of primary capabilities 
significantly more than when complementarity is low.  
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2.4.1 Systems of Capabilities 
  
Earlier, we argued that supportive capabilities (secondary and fluid capabilities) build 
upon primary capabilities to produce competitive advantage that are more durable and stronger 
when capabilities are complementary. The latter part of this argument reflects this idea of 
systems. We define a system as “…a group of interdependent and interrelated components that 
form a complex and unified whole intended to serve some purpose through the performance of 
its interacting parts (Meyer and Miller 2011, p. 90).” Our review of archival records finds that 
while retail leaders tend to have a very common set of resources, what distinguishes them is their 
understanding of resource fit and their resulting decision to deploy systems rather than individual 
capabilities.  
Zhu (2004, p. 11) explains the strength of systems by stating the following: “Individual 
resources can be duplicated across firms, yet what is far more difficult to duplicate is the 
resource configurations of technologies, infrastructure, business processes, and the related 
synergies among them.” Porter (1996) adds that even if rivals are able to identify the components 
in systems, it is unlikely that they will be able to identify the actions and decisions needed to 
achieve a high degree of fit and subsequently achieve expected returns. The consequence of the 
inimitability of systems is stronger, more defensible competitive advantages than otherwise 
(Porter 1996, Zhu 2004).  
The notion that systems of constructs exist within organizations is not new (e.g., see 
Simon 1969, Weick 1976, Levinthal and March 1993, Tiwana and Keil 2007, Tiwana 2008). It is 
widely accepted in ecology, biology, planning, transportation, sociology, and the information 
system and strategy fields that organizations and processes are systems supported by various 
overlapping components (Simon 1969 and Weick 1976). These components perform unique 
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functions but together advance a common goal. Not only do links and connections exist between 
components, but these components are responsive to one another and interdependent (Weick 
1976).  We argue that comparable links exist between marketing resources and in doing so 
identify four systems of capabilities retail leaders have used to achieve competitive advantage 
and explain how these systems work.  
Table 2 proposes relationships between the primary and supportive capabilities 
(secondary and fluid capabilities). We inductively derived this table from the literature, archival 
records, and managerial interviews—updating and revising it along the way. We used the 
typology presented in Figure 1 as our starting point to distinguish the primary capabilities from 
the supportive ones. We then compared the interviewees’ comments to pinpoint the combination 
of supportive capabilities underlying each primary capability and further identify the supportive 
capabilities strongly related to each primary. To reconcile conflicting opinions and identify 
relationships not highlighted by the interviewees we referenced the literature and archival 
records. Furthermore, the archival records provided concrete examples of retailers’ resource 
deployment decisions. This process continued iteratively until a framework that all the authors 
agreed upon was created.  
Table 2.Relationships between Capabilities 
 Primary Capabilities 
 Brand 
Management 
Buying 
Ability 
Customer 
Service 
Market 
Sensing 
 
 
Fluid Capabilities 
Distribution and Logistics L-M H H L 
IT Skills L L H H 
Price-Value Relationship M-H H L-M L 
Property Management  L L M-H L 
 
 
Secondary Capabilities 
Divestment Management H L M L-M 
Inter-functional 
Partnerships 
L M L-M H 
Novel Shopping 
Experience 
L-M L M L 
Risk Management L M-H M L-M 
  Note: L= Low, M=Medium, H=High  
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As Table 2 suggests, systems are organized around the primary capabilities because they 
are the foundation of retail advantage and represent four pervasive pillars of retail success. It 
follows that retailers should leverage supportive resources to advance primary capabilities’ 
functions and objectives. The supportive capabilities labeled as “low” and “medium” have little 
effective relationship with the associated primary capability, and those classified as “medium to 
high” and “high” critically impact their associated primary capabilities. Together with their 
associated primary capabilities, the critical resources form systems exhibiting second-order fit. 
Critical resources “enable” their associated primary capabilities and are not the outcomes of the 
primary capability’s processes. Thus, for example, IT skills enable market sensing and is a 
component of its system but risk management is an outcome of market sensing activities and is 
therefore not included in this system
2
.  
Our entries in Table 2 (and the corresponding Figure 2) are speculative at this point, they 
are based on related arguments in the literature as well as insights generated through our 
managerial interviews. In the discussion below, we identify the components in each of these 
systems and explain why they are included and other capabilities are not.  
2.4.1.1 Brand system. The first system centers on brand management and entails 
developing independent pricing, positioning, promotion, and placement strategies for each brand, 
while simultaneously minimizing brand cannibalization and ultimately maximizing profit (Aaker 
1991).  These goals are best accomplished by managing the price-value relationship and 
divesting when appropriate. For lower to mid-tier retailers, the price-value relationship supports 
                                                          
2 It is important to recognize that while elements in systems are linked and responsive, they maintain a 
 degree of distinctness. Thus, according to Orton and Weick (1990, p. 205), these elements are “loosely 
 coupled.”  
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brand management by allowing firms to simultaneously appeal to price and quality sensitive 
customers so that they reach a variety of customer segments. However, for upper-tier retailers 
like Nordstrom’s, the goal is to remain focused on an elite customer segment but better serve 
them by shifting the relative emphasis placed on price as opposed to value.  For example, in its 
2008 annual report Nordstrom’s claims the following: “…it became clear that value and price 
sensitivity are important factors to our customers...Our merchants are working hard with our 
vendors to provide the right balance of quality, value, and price points to consumers (p.15).” In 
line with this, Nordstrom’s website indicates that customers can find brands as varied as Calvin 
Klein to Jimmy Choo. Though the Calvin Klein brand offers average quality and reasonably 
priced products, the Nicole Miller brand offers high quality products at high prices.  
Divestment management plays a different, though equally important role in supporting 
brand management initiatives. Firms may find it necessary to divest brands that are unprofitable 
or overlap too much with more preferred brands to establish unique DNAs for each of their 
brands (Mahajan et al. 1990). Despite the apparent benefits of divestment, we recognize that 
retailers may find it difficult to maintain the assortment of brands for which they are noted at 
price points that consumers demand. Those who strike this balance will achieve competitive 
advantage.   
It is clear that the price-value relationships and divestment management work in opposite 
directions to support brand-based advantage. The price-value relationship is expansionary and 
allows firms to target customer segments with distinct preferences, but divestment management 
emphasizes contraction with the goal of making sure the retailers’ brands remain focused and 
relevant. Macy’s has nevertheless successfully integrated both divestment and the price-value 
relationship to build a branding advantage. In the company’s 2004 Annual Report its CEO Terry 
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J. Lundgren stated: “Recognizing that great product assortments and brands in our stores create 
customer excitement and build loyalty among shoppers…we are pursuing a good-better-best 
merchandising strategy that aligns our assortments with our core customer’s expectation for price 
and quality. And we are more tightly editing assortments to reduce duplication and clutter on the 
selling floor (Macy’s 2004 Annual report, p. 6).” As this example and proceeding discussion 
suggest, price-value and divestment management not only make it easier to execute brand 
management programs do increase their functionality as well. Thus, these capabilities form a 
second-order system.  
The question then arises, why does the brand system consist of only two supportive 
capabilities? Consider IT skills, inter-functional partnerships, and risk and property management. 
Though these capabilities are important, they do not significantly help managers create unique 
DNAs for their brands. The same goes for a novel shopping experience; although a novel 
shopping experience can be used in conjunction with brand management to communicate a 
certain aura, this capability is not as instrumental to creating unique positions for each brand. 
And a retailer’s distribution system may impact prices charged for its brands but does not help it 
position each brand uniquely. Because these six capabilities are relatively less important to brand 
management, they are excluded from this system. As this discussion makes clear, the 
aforementioned six capabilities may be used in conjunction with brand management to 
communicate a consistent image but do not facilitate the development of unique brand positions.  
2.4.1.2 Service System. The ability to provide superior customer service has been found 
to have a strong link to increased overall firm performance (e.g., Anderson et al. 1994; Bolton 
1998).   This can come about, for example, as a result of being able to provide enhanced value to 
customers (via unique product – service combinations), through the deepening of customer 
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relationships, and by gaining customer insights during service interactions (Homburg et al. 
2002).  Customer service is sustained by three supportive capabilities. First, successfully 
executing a customer service program requires that retailers consistently deliver goods to 
customers in a timely fashion by operating quality distribution and logistics programs. By 
ensuring the right assortment of goods is available and that these goods are in usable condition, 
retailers encourage customer loyalty and higher levels of service.  
Second, retailers are emphasizing IT skills to minimize check-out times and increase the 
functionality of their websites to improve service levels. For instance, “[Nordstrom’s]… 
enhanced the customer experience through better use of technology, increased the speed and 
convenience of shopping, and provided more responsive products and services. The company 
continues to build on its legacy of personal connections with customers by innovatively 
extending the service experience and meeting customers’ changing expectations in-store, online 
and through mobile devices… this strategy and these activities will lead to additional market 
share gains and higher returns over the long term.”  Many top retailers are also investing in 
technology startups to build effective multichannel engagement strategies. For example, Home 
Depot recently acquired technology startup Black Locus to help it compete in the dynamic online 
world (Banjo 2013). It is hoped that by increasing the consistency and functionality of their 
mobile, digital, in-store, and social channels Home Depot and others will be better able to engage 
and ultimately serve customers.  
Finally, retailers must understand how property management promotes customer service. 
First, colocation decisions offer greater convenience to consumers by minimizing their shopping 
time and effort.  Second, retailers must maintain the physical properties through systematic 
functional and aesthetic upgrades.  Such investments create a customer friendly atmosphere and 
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in that sense promote service-based advantages. This relationship is most clear when looking at 
K-Mart whose underinvestment in property management decreased its short term expenses and 
contributed to its superior short-run performance (K-Mart 2006-2008 Annual Reports). 
According to the interviewees, this strategy backfired over the long-run--negatively impacting 
the retailer’s shopping atmosphere and service rating, its ability to provide a quality shopping 
experience, and contributing in part to its demise.  
From this discussion, it is clear the effects of the aforementioned supportive capabilities 
extend beyond mere consistency. Companies can achieve high customer service levels in the 
absence of strong IT skills, property management programs, and supply chain initiatives, but 
having these elements increases the value of one’s customer service programs. These supportive 
capabilities increase the functionality and overall value received from service-based initiatives 
and in doing so form a system exhibiting second-order fit.  
Sears and Lowe’s provide practical examples of this system. According to Sears’ 2006 
Annual Report it deployed these capabilities to increase its service levels. The company 
specifically leveraged a service-based initiative designed to: improve the company’s agility and 
ability to deliver merchandise, complete its e-commerce development center and increase its 
technical functionality, and improve the appearance of its stores to augment customers’ in-store-
shopping experiences. Lowes, however, exclusively focuses on the logistics aspect of customer 
service. Since 2002 the firm has aggressively developed its distribution network with the goals of 
optimizing inventory and distribution, insulating it from natural disasters and other unforeseen 
events, and ultimately offering its customers more convenience and better service.  
Though Sears, Lowe’s, and other retailers in our sample have created service-based 
advantage none of these companies simultaneously leverage all components of the service 
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system. Failure to simultaneously incorporate each of these facets prevents retailers from 
achieving expected returns from their service programs and can lead to relative under-
performance.    
Importantly, we learn that the emphasis placed on novelty largely differs across firms. 
For example, the managers argue that novelty only reinforces customer service for premiere 
retailers like Nordstrom’s, but is relatively unimportant for value-based retailers like Wal-Mart 
and Big Lot’s (Kalwani et al. 1990). Similarly, Inter-functional coordination ensures that large 
companies execute concerted service efforts, but is largely unimportant to smaller firms where 
functional separation is minimal and relatively few people are responsible for the company’s 
operations (Eisenberg et al. 1998). Risk management is not included in this system because its 
impact on customer service is indirect. Finally, divestment management and the price-value 
relationship tend to be outcomes rather than enablers of customer service programs. Retailers 
may find it necessary to eliminate certain relationships or shift their emphasis on the price-value 
continuum to enhance customer service.   
2.4.1.3 Sensing System. The third system revolves around market sensing—the ability to 
gather, interpret, and respond to pertinent market information (e.g. Day 1994, Kohli and 
Jaworksi 1990). Those retailers that are “More attuned than their peers to reading market signs, 
high-performance retail grocers [retailers] enjoy insights into both consumers and competitors—
insights that give them both first-mover advantage and the ability to respond rapidly to threats 
and challenges with a steady stream of small-scale product and offer innovations (Accenture, 
p.9).” 
Market sensing is reinforced by inter-functional partnerships and IT skills. Kohli and 
Jaworski (1990) argue that the information received from market sensing activities is fruitless if 
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it is not used to create consistent, cross-functional programs to better serve consumers and react 
to market changes. They note that inter-functional partnerships facilitate information 
dissemination which in turn encourages “…concerted responses to market needs… (Kohli and 
Jaworksi 1990, p. 56).”  Thus, inter-functional partnerships convert the information received 
from sensing into valuable programs and in that sense enable market sensing.     
Although previous works do not document the relationship between market sensing and 
IT skills, the interviewees make this link. According to them, IT skills support market sensing 
activities in three ways. First, IT skills facilitate information collection and in that sense serve as 
an antecedent to market sensing. Second, IT skills expedite the rate at which key information is 
disseminated and in this case work concurrently with market sensing activities.  Third, IT skills 
are vital to creating actionable programs from market sensing activities. According to the 
interviewees, IT skills help retailers analyze customer information, interpret trends, effectively 
respond to opportunities in the external market environment, and efficiently respond to 
competitive threats.  
Together with market sensing programs, Lowe’s has leveraged its IT skills and inter-
functional partnerships to build a knowledge-intensive customer relationship database. Through 
this database Lowe’s has not only been able to efficiently and effectively respond to customers’ 
“…changing attitudes and discriminating needs (Lowe’ 2002 Annual Report, p.6),” but respond 
to competitors to gain a retailer advantage. From this discussion and example it is clear that the 
market sensing capability exhibits second-order fit. Specifically, the capabilities comprising the 
market sensing system build upon and reinforce one another to create a feedback loop. Firms 
begin by leveraging IT skills to gain pertinent information, after which they disseminate this 
information using inter-functional partnerships to develop a market sensing program which is 
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then assessed using IT skills, etc. So together these aforementioned capabilities increase the 
functionality of and value received from market sensing capabilities, and doing so exhibit 
second-order fit.  
The other supportive capabilities are outcomes of market sensing activities rather than its 
precursors or reinforcing elements. Thus, these capabilities are excluded from the market sensing 
system. For instance, firms may adjust their distribution programs (i.e. ordering levels, turnover 
times) and the emphasis placed on price relative to value in response to information acquired 
during market sensing activities. And while market sensing allows firms to acquire information 
needed to minimize risks, risk management does not facilitate the collection and interpretation of 
information and is therefore non-essential to the market sensing activities. Additionally, firms 
may find it necessary to emphasize (or deemphasize) novelty given their firms’ overall goals and 
changing customer preferences, both of which become more refined through market sensing 
activities.  
2.4.1.4 Buying System. The final system is built around buying ability: a retailer’s ability 
to consistently buy merchandise with consumers’ demands in mind and maintain the mix of 
“traditional” products for which they are noted (Frigo 2002). The interviewed managers noted 
that a key to optimizing buying ability is developing strong relationships with a limited number 
of supply chain partners. Such relationships allow retailers to establish supply chain power, 
increase the efficiency of supply chain operations, minimize prices charged to consumers, and 
ultimately maximize profit margins. In addition, without supply chain coordination firms may 
overestimate demand, misinterpret trends, and generally fail to execute quality buying initiatives. 
Basically, supply chain management ensures that the assortment and quantities purchased by 
retailers match consumers’ demands.  
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Failure to foresee and effectively manage supply chain erosions and comparable fat tail 
risks negatively impacts buying ability as well. Risk management supports buying advantages by 
making sure retailers’ supply chains have the foresight and flexibility needed to efficiently 
respond to environmental changes and maintain their product assortment. According to Ruud 
Bosman, Executive Vice President of FM International “Prior to Hurricane Katrina, in 2005, 
companies whose supply chains were dependent upon access to the Mississippi River via the port 
of New Orleans, LA, USA might have imagined that contracts with multiple shippers inoculated 
them against transportation risk. After Katrina, one of the most devastating natural disasters in 
the U.S. history, the fallacy of that thinking was exposed: nothing was moving through New 
Orleans (p.8).” Not only did this supply chain disruption make it more difficult for retailers to get 
products to consumers in timely fashions, it also increased their distribution costs, and in part 
eroded their performance advantages.   
Implicit in this discussion is that buying advantages are created by minimizing the 
volatility and vulnerability of future cash flows.  Our research specifically indicates that both 
strong supply chain and risk management ensure that retailers’ buying patterns reflect trends in 
the external environment, that retailers maintain the mix of products for which they are noted, 
and in doing so minimize the risks of future cash flows. The joint effects of buying ability, 
distribution and logistics, and risk management are appreciated by many retail leaders like 
Macy’s.  Per the company’s 2011 Annual Report: 
“The Company’s procurement of goods and services from outside the United States is 
subject to risks associated with political or financial instability, trade restrictions, tariffs, 
currency exchange rates, transport capacity and costs and other factors…All of these 
factors may affect the Company’s ability to access suitable merchandise on acceptable 
terms, are beyond the Company’s control and could adversely impact the Company’s 
performance.”  
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` As this example suggests, instead of just exhibiting continuity, supply chain and risk 
management activities enable one another, and together facilitate buying programs. Although 
buying advantages exist without supply chain and risk management, these supportive capabilities 
increase the value received from buying programs and in doing so extend their associated 
advantages. Thus, these capabilities form a system exhibiting second-order fit. Importantly, 
however, the other supportive capabilities do not facilitate the purchase of relevant merchandise. 
For instance, both novel shopping experience and property management may be used along with 
buying ability to communicate a consistent image but do not help with procurement. In the same 
vein, divestment is an outcome of buying programs as firms may find it necessary to eliminate 
certain merchandise because it no longer reflects consumers’ demands. And though IT skills can 
be used to manage product assortment, they do relatively little to aid in purchasing merchandise. 
Unlike the three previously mentioned capabilities, inter-functional partnerships moderately 
impact a retailer’s buying ability. Through Kohli and Jaworski’s (1990) work we learn that inter-
functional coordination facilitates the collection of pertinent information through market sensing 
activities, information which is used to adjust buying programs to reflect consumers’ demands. 
Basically, inter-functional coordination indirectly rather than directly encourages buying 
programs causing it to be omitted from this system.  
The four aforementioned systems are illustrated in Figure 2. By clearly identifying the 
systems of retail capabilities, rather than explaining all the relationships between primary and 
supportive capabilities, this figure reiterates our point that retailers are best served by 
emphasizing groups of interrelated capabilities.  
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Figure 2. Systems of Retail Capabilities 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
 
The propositions set forth have important and direct managerial and theoretical 
implications. Key to our work is that retailers often establish competitive advantages but rarely 
sustain them because they: (1) attempt to develop multiple primary capabilities at once instead of 
focusing on one or two, (2) treat all capabilities as equally important, and/or (3) emphasize 
individual capabilities instead of systems. Even our review of industry leaders’ archival records 
indicates that few (if any) value all three of these aforementioned processes.  
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Recall from our earlier discussion that few retailers have the capital and organizational 
slack needed to simultaneously develop multiple primary capabilities well. Emphasizing many 
capabilities may lead to superior short-term performance (because the benefits of what is done 
are felt over relatively short time periods), but is likely to be unsustainable over the long-run 
because capabilities allotted insufficient investments produce weak and indefensible competitive 
advantages.  
Although we have devoted considerable time to defining primary, secondary, and fluid 
capabilities and explicating each group’s value-creation path we again revisit this topic here. 
Primary capabilities warrant the most emphasis, while secondary capabilities deserve less. 
Further, the emphasis placed on fluid capabilities depends on external market factors. An 
appreciation of a capability’s differential importance prevents over-emphasis in non-critical areas 
and under-emphasis in critical ones, maximizes the productivity of one’s investments, and 
ultimately leads to superior retail performance.  
Perhaps the central managerial implication of this research is that we (1) identify systems 
of capabilities retailer leaders have used and (2) explain how they may produce superior 
competitive position. We specifically argue that jointly leveraging primary and supportive 
capabilities leads to competitive advantage, but these advantages are stronger and more durable 
when the capabilities deployed reinforce one another. So, though secondary capabilities 
moderate the primary-performance relationship and fluid capabilities also moderate this 
relationship, their effects are significantly larger and more beneficial when they complement the 
primary capability of interest. Failure to appreciate the importance of capability fit and 
understand how it promotes superior performance may prevent retailers from maximizing value 
from their capabilities, and establishing sizeable and long-lasting competitive advantages. 
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Importantly, we find that not all systems are created equally. Instead, as Porter (1996) argues, the 
extent of competitive advantage increases with fit between capabilities; first-order systems 
provide temporary advantages, second-order systems provide more sustainable advantages, and 
third-order systems provide the most durable advantages. It therefore appears that retailers must 
make an effort to transition their first-order systems into second-order ones, and ultimately push 
to achieve third-order fit to maximize performance over the long-run.  
Another key to managing systems is appreciating the strategic tradeoffs inherent to 
deploying one system over another (Porter 1996).  Although some supportive capabilities are 
shared between systems, integrating a capability in one area limits its functionality and 
productivity in others. For example, IT skills function differently in the customer service and 
market sensing systems so that using IT skills in both areas limits its productivity and detracts 
from both systems. This means that neither system will reach its expected performance level. So 
while retailers may successfully develop market sensing and buying systems or brand and 
service systems, overlap between other systems should be avoided.  To note, although Macy’s 
has leveraged its buying and brand management initiatives to achieve competitive advantage 
Porter (1996) would argue that both of these systems are actually underperforming; the potential 
advantages from these systems are stronger and more durable than what we are currently seeing.  
Importantly, systems take time to build and their performance effects are rarely if ever 
immediate. For example, retailers must continuously evaluate systems to improve the fit and 
cohesiveness of capabilities, identify potential sources of slack, and identify capabilities that 
should be added to (deleted from) the system. This temporal gap is especially strong for the 
systems involving more complex systems--customer service and buying ability—because they 
involve relatively more supportive capabilities making it more difficult to achieve cohesiveness. 
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This is not to say that retailers should postpone development of service and buying programs, but 
instead that it may take longer for performance-based advantages to come to fruition than 
advantages from the other systems. The opposite is true for brand management and market 
sensing. Because these systems involve fewer capabilities, achieving a high degree of fit and the 
associated performance increases will be more immediate.  
While novel shopping experience is important to retail success, this capability is not 
critical to any of the systems. Novel shopping experience may be an outcome of a retailer’s 
market sensing and customer service programs, and can be used to reaffirm a company’s buying 
and branding strategies. It follows that novelty may be the least significant retail capability and it 
should be the least of a retailer’s concerns. Specifically, firms should develop novel shopping 
experience after securing strongholds in other areas.  
Despite these recommendations we recognize that a retailer’s existing resources, strategy, 
and competitive position, as well as competitors’ strengths and positions may encourage 
different courses of action. Thus, retailers may be more successful developing capabilities in a 
different order or a different set of capabilities all together. And though retail leaders have used 
the identified systems to achieve competitive advantage, this does not mean that other resource 
combinations cannot be valuable. On the contrary, it appears that retailers may be successful by 
emphasizing a unique system of capabilities tailored to its strategy.  However, the systems 
identified appear to be minimal requirement needed to achieve competitive advantage in the 
retail industry.  
2.5.1 Theoretical Implications  
This research makes three theoretical contributions to the field. First, we identify twelve 
key capabilities that foster retail advantage.  
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Second, we explain how each of these capabilities impacts retail performance. We argue that 
capabilities can be grouped into one of three categories—primary, secondary, or fluid—each of 
which uniquely impacts retail performance. As primary capabilities, market sensing, brand 
management, customer service, and buying ability are vital to all retailers and in themselves lead 
to competitive advantage. Comparatively, secondary capabilities build upon primary capabilities 
to improve performance and the emphasis placed on them largely depends on the retailer’s 
strategic orientation. Four such capabilities exist in the retail context: divestment and risk 
management, novel shopping experience, and inter-functional partnerships. 
Finally, the effect of a fluid capability’s value creation path depends on external market 
factors. Distribution and logistics and the price-value relationship directly lead to competitive 
advantage in weak economies, but must interact with primary capabilities to produce competitive 
advantage in strong economies; the opposite holds true for property management. Finally IT 
skills directly lead to competitive advantage when technological changes are radical, though they 
require the presence of primary capabilities to create advantage when such changes are minimal. 
This perspective should be studied in future works to further our understanding of competitive 
advantage.  
Third, we suggest that systems of interrelated capabilities exist. We argue that leveraging 
systems of capabilities (rather than individual capabilities) can lead to sustained competitive 
advantage. This idea of systems further supports our point that retailers must maintain at least 
status-quo investments in all areas, because components are responsive to one another and under-
investment in one area has far-reaching effects. Viewing capabilities in isolation encourages 
retailers to focus on individual capabilities instead of the benefits provided to consumers and 
ultimately prevents them from achieving sustained competitive advantage.  
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3.0 Essay II: Survival of The Fittest:  How Competitive Overlap and Retail 
Format Impact Incumbents’ Vulnerability 
 
Many incumbent retailers are finding it increasingly difficult to succeed in the face of 
growing challenges from discounters and large national chains that have eroded the high profit 
margins once characteristic of the retailing industry (Hausman and Leibtag 2004; Jia 2008; Singh 
et al. 2006). For example, warehouse clubs and supercenters have experienced a 10.1% increase 
in food expenditures over the past decade, while supermarkets have experienced a 3% decline 
(Sichtermann 2011). Singh et al. (2006, p. 457) summarize this phenomenon nicely: “Rapid 
growth of alternative retail formats, in the form of mass discounters, wholesale clubs, and 
supercenters, has transformed not only the competitive structure of the industry, but also the way 
in which consumers shop.” 
Researchers have argued that incumbent retailers can address these mounting challenges 
by pursuing one of two competitive strategies — differentiation or emulation, (e.g. Ailawadi et 
al. 2010; Porter 1980 and 1998).  Differentiation allows firms to appeal to niche segments that 
are otherwise poorly served by dominant retailers and create a perception of exclusivity (Rogers 
2001). Lane Bryant, a clothier that specializes in offering fashionable plus size clothes, is one of 
the most prominent examples of differentiation in the apparel industry. Conversely, emulation 
suggests that firms are best served by copying a dominant retailer’s business model (Ailawadi et 
al. 2010; Rogers 2001). Because Wal-Mart is the largest firm, this may mean copying its strategy 
rather than developing proprietary ones.  
Firms can offer services aimed at both emulation and differentiation and choose the set of 
services to offer based on their overall strategic orientation. For example, the addition and/or 
expansion of film processing and pharmaceutical services allow firms to emulate Wal-Mart, but 
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changes to loyalty programs lead to differentiation. We therefore view the services chosen by a 
firm as a reflection of their strategic direction decision, as will be described later. We see this as 
a continuum, a relationship we capture by introducing the notion of “strategic service 
orientation” (SSO).  
This paper adds to the existing literature in five ways. First, we explain how incumbents’ 
existing strategies impact sales lost to new entrants. That is, instead of studying incumbents’ 
responses to new competitors, we argue that incumbents’ existing strategies can insulate them 
from harm. Second, we clarify the role services play in competitive environments. As our review 
of past literature will show, previous work has studied how services impact baseline 
performance, but we are the first to link them to competitive advantage.  In addition, we test the 
differential effectiveness of two competitive positions —differentiation and emulation— 
identified by Porter (1980, 1998). Of particular interest to us is understanding which of these 
positions best minimizes customer switching, where switching is defined as customers’ decisions 
to spend a larger share of their wallets at new entrants. We also investigate the differential 
performance effects of new discounters and new upscale stores. Although new upscale stores 
pose significant threats to incumbent retailers, previous literature has only studied the effects of 
new Wal-Marts. Finally, we study the role that an incumbent’s retail format has on its ability to 
compete against new entrants. Here, we are interested in understanding if the optimal strategy 
(emulation or differentiation) is consistent across incumbent format or if incumbents of different 
formats are best served by emphasizing different strategies.  
To accomplish these goals, the remainder of this paper is divided as follows. We first 
review relevant literature, after which we explain the basis of our SSO construct. In the third 
section we introduce our hypotheses. We then discuss our methodology and present the results 
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from a quasi-experiment which uses field data. Finally, we draw conclusions from our results, 
and close with a discussion of our work’s theoretical and managerial implications.  
3.1 RETAIL PERFORMANCE 
Retail performance can be influenced by both store-level (e.g. floral, pharmaceutical, and 
food services) and competitive market-level factors. Both sets of factors have the potential to 
help firms maximize their performance and compete against new entrants. A review of recent 
works that study the effectiveness of these factors identifies several gaps that are discussed in 
more detail below. 
3.1.1 Store-level Drivers of Retail Performance  
One set of retail performance research has focused on various determinants of retail 
success, including competitive, store-level, customer, and market characteristics. This research 
indicates that each of these variables is important, though some are disproportionately more so. 
For example, Hoch et al. (1995) demonstrate that consumer and competitive factors account for 
67% of the variation in price elasticity.  However, the importance of consumer and competitive 
factors largely disappears when market factors are also considered (Reinartz and Kumar 1999). 
Reinartz and Kumar (1999) find that market factors are disproportionately more important than 
other factors and that firm location is a particularly important determinant of retail performance.  
Recently, the retail performance literature has shifted towards understanding the 
performance impacts of individual services. This research indicates that floral and 
pharmaceutical services (Pauler et al. 2009), and scrambled merchandising significantly increase 
retail sales (Reinartz and Kumar 1999; Kumar and Karande 2000). In addition, assortment 
breadth, service quality, store atmosphere, and a low pricing strategy can be used to increase 
store patronage (Pan and Zinkhan 2006).  Food services (e.g. a hot bar or restaurant) have a 
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negligible impact on performance, while it is unclear whether film and banking services improve 
firm performance (Reinartz and Kumar 1999; Kumar and Karande 2000). Also, selling more 
non-grocery items increases dollar sales but negatively impacts sales per square foot. To explain 
this result, Kumar and Karande (2000) argue that non-grocery items tend to be very expensive 
and bulky, which together negatively impact sales productivity.  
3.1.2 Competitive Drivers of Retail Performance 
This research differs from that reviewed earlier in that it does not study performance at 
the store-level, but instead looks at returns relative to one’s competitors. It indicates that 
location, low pricing, assortment, customer service initiatives, cleanliness, and shopping 
environment can be leveraged to achieve competitive advantage in retail (Arnold et al. 1983). Of 
these factors, superior location and low pricing are the only two that can be leveraged to achieve 
competitive advantages over extended periods, while the others merely produce advantages over 
the short-run (Arnold et al. 1983).   
Other studies have examined how best to respond to a new Wal-Mart entry, and found 
that differentiation is superior to emulation (Ailawadi et al. 2010; Basker and Noel 2009). 
Retailers can minimize Wal-Mart’s impact by increasing prices, shrinking assortments, 
increasing stock of top-tier and private label brand, increasing the breadth and depth of their 
promotional campaigns, and adopting other activities to exploit niche populations (Ailawadi et 
al. 2010). In line with this, Basker and Noel (2009) demonstrate that prices tend to drop 1% to 
1.2% after Wal-Mart’s entry and that this drop is significantly steeper for low-end firms that 
directly compete against Wal-Mart. Such a price decrease makes it difficult for these firms to 
achieve favorable margins, be profitable, and ultimately be successful.  
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Although our paper is within the tradition of that established by these earlier works, it is 
directed towards issues not addressed by these papers. For example Ailawadi et al. (2010) look at 
the marketing mix, while we study services. Existing research also assumes that incumbents 
change their offerings in response to new entrants, but we argue that few retailers drastically alter 
their offerings in response to a single new entrant in a local market. This is not to say that 
strategic reaction is unimportant, but instead that a firm’s existing strategy may represent its best 
option to successfully compete against new entrants in general. Similarly, much research in this 
area strictly focuses on new Wal-Marts, but fails to recognize that other retailers – and upscale 
stores in particular – also pose significant threats to established retailers. Finally, although 
existing works have studied the impact of firms’ service offerings on store performance, we are 
the first to study their ability to insulate incumbent retailers from new entrants.  
3.2 STRATEGIC SERVICE ORIENTATION 
 
Porter (1980, 1998) identifies differentiation and cost leadership as generic strategies 
firms can use to achieve competitive advantage. Differentiation allows firms to create a 
perception of exclusivity, charge premium prices, and ultimately create a highly defensible 
competitive position.  Thus, a differentiation-based focus allows incumbent retailers to maintain 
unique competitive positions relative to new entrants.  
In contrast, firms that attempt to achieve cost leadership must engage in activities 
designed to increase efficiency, take advantage of economies of scale, minimize overhead 
controls, and pursue other cost-minimizing activities. In line with this, the strategy literature 
suggests that emulation leads to cost-based advantage. Emulation allows firms to piggy-back on 
competitors’ investments, learn from their mistakes, and identify competitive deficiencies that 
can be exploited (Lieberman and Montgomery 1998). Similarly, emulators can benefit from their 
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peers’ advertising campaigns aimed at introducing and/or educating markets about new services, 
again minimizing their costs.  
Although the terms “emulation” and “differentiation” imply strategic reaction, recall that 
our research seeks to understand how incumbents’ existing strategies allow them to compete 
against new entrants. As such, we use emulation and differentiation to capture the degree of 
similarity and dissimilarity between an incumbent’s service offerings and those of a new entrant. 
We introduce the idea of strategic service orientation (SSO) to capture the relative emphasis 
firms place on services aimed at emulation versus those aimed at differentiation. This construct 
builds on the idea that firms’ service offerings lie along a continuum -- they can exclusively offer 
services that emulate or exclusively offer services that differentiate, or some combination of 
both. This approach is similar to that used by Mizik and Jacobson (2003) for their strategic 
orientation construct, which assesses the relative emphasis firms place on activities aimed at 
value appropriation versus value creation by subtracting the amount of a firm’s investment in 
resources aimed at value creation (e.g., R&D expenditures) from its investment in value 
appropriation (e.g., advertising expenditures), and dividing this value by the firm’s total 
resources. In line with this, we determine a retailer’s SSO by subtracting the number of services 
aimed at differentiation from the number of services it offers aimed at emulation, and then divide 
this value by the total number of services offered by incumbent i relative to new entrant j at time 
t. Formally: 
       
                                                                 
                   
  
 
Emulation measures the degree of service offering similarity between incumbents and 
new entrants, while differentiation captures the degree of uniqueness or difference between the 
53 
 
two retailers. Thus, incumbents that share many services with a new entrant have positive SSO 
values, but those with many unique services relative to the new entrant have negative SSO 
values. SSO is computed for each incumbent relative to the new entrant. (It is important to note 
that this measure of SSO is only defined once a new competitor enters the incumbent’s market.) 
We argue that the degree of similarity (dissimilarity) is not absolute, but instead depends on the 
stores involved (e.g., Giant Eagle could be perceived as highly similar to Trader Joe’s, but very 
dissimilar from Wal-Mart). 
3.3 HYPOTHESES 
The relationships of interest are summarized in Figure 3. As this figure shows, we 
hypothesize that SSO directly impacts an incumbent’s sales losses to new entrants. This 
hypothesis is broken into two parts. We first consider the effect of new Wal-Marts in H1a and 
new specialty stores in H1b.  Hypothesis 1 suggests that the new entrant’s format (if the new 
entrant is a specialty store or not) moderates the SSO-performance relationship. Further, we 
argue that the SSO-incumbent performance relationship is moderated by characteristics of the 
trade area (e.g., retail density, the physical distance between the incumbent and the new entrant) 
that can impact the incumbent’s SSO.  These relationships are addressed in hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Finally, we include measures of household income and household size as control variables 
because both have been shown to be important in previous studies (e.g. Bell et al. 1998; Bell and 
Lattin 1998). 
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Figure 3. Conceptual Framework  
 
 
3.3.1 Main Effect of SSO on Sales 
Although Rogers (2001) and Singh et al. (2006) provide solid descriptions of emulation 
and differentiation, they treat these strategies as equally valuable. However, competitive 
positions are differentially effective, with firms often best served by positioning themselves as 
unique and adopting differentiation-based competitive positions (e.g. Ailawadi et al. 2010; 
Basker and Noel 2009). For example, Steenkamp and Dekimpe (1997) argue that differentiated 
private label brands make retailers significantly less vulnerable in those categories. Ailawadi et 
al. (2010) add that in the face of new discounters, incumbent retailers are best served by 
emphasizing top-tier brands, modestly increasing prices, and engaging in other activities that 
minimize overlap.  
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Rogers (2001) advances this pro-differentiation position from a managerial perspective 
by arguing that the key to thriving in the grocery industry is establishing competitive advantages 
in customer service, perishables, community involvement, and other areas where new entrants 
are deficient. Taking advantage of these weaknesses allows firms to better serve niche 
populations, establish advantages in these populations, create barriers to switching, and 
subsequently lessen but not completely erase new entrants’ advantages. Without such barriers 
customers become deal prone and switch between retailers to find the best deals.  
Though valuable, the aforementioned works study strategic reaction and the long-run 
implications of retail performance, while our paper seeks to understand how incumbent retailers 
can minimize the immediate effects of new entrants and is more short-run oriented. The first-
mover literature offers insight into the optimal competitive position over the short-run by 
suggesting that being the first successful entrant to a market allows firms to establish large and 
loyal customer bases that are largely unwilling to switch to new competitors because of the 
opportunity costs of doing so (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1998; Lieberman and Montgomery 
1998; Makadok 2001).  Thus, incumbent retailers are able to establish competitive barriers that 
limit customer switching, at least over the short-run.  
For instance, though upscale stores like Trader Joe’s and Whole Foods are rapidly 
entering the Columbus market, the first-mover literature suggests that Giant Eagle Market 
Districts (Market Districts) will suffer smaller sales losses from these new entrants than Giant 
Eagle’s more mainstream stores. This difference exists because Market Districts in themselves 
are upscale, their offerings are comparable to the new entrant’s, and there is thus little motivation 
for customers to switch. But first-mover advantages diminish when the new entrant provides a 
unique and valuable service offering (Shankar et al. 1998). In this case, the new entrant captures 
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a share of the incumbent’s consumers whose demands are not adequately met and switching 
from the incumbent ensues at a high rate. As this example suggests, consumers are largely 
unmotivated to switch to new entrants when their needs are already met but are motivated to 
switch when the new entrant provides a valuable offering not already available in the market 
(Shankar et al. 1998).   
So while it is important that incumbents focus on niche populations to minimize the 
degree of direct competition over the long term, serving as the benchmark against which the new 
entrant is compared is best over short periods. Taking this a step further, differentiating may 
minimize the new entrant’s effect over the long-run, but being highly similar to the new 
competitor through emulation best minimizes immediate sales losses and is therefore superior 
over the short run. We argue that when new entrants do not bring anything unique to target trade 
areas they will find it difficult to erode the competitive advantage already established by 
incumbents that are highly similar to them. Therefore, incumbents with higher SSO values (i.e., 
emphasize emulation over differentiation) should experience significantly smaller sales losses 
from new entrants — upscale retailers and Wal-Marts -- than incumbents with lower SSO values. 
Following this:   
H1: Retail incumbents that have more similar service offerings to new entrants 
(i.e., higher SSO values) will outperform their peers after new competitor 
entry.  
 
While we argue that emulation minimizes sales losses from new Wal-Marts and new 
upscale retailers, this effect should be stronger in the latter case. Research suggests that 
incumbents find it particularly difficult to compete against Wal-Mart because of its size, 
resources, brand equity, and assortment breadth (e.g. Ailawadi et al. 2010; Singh et al 2004; 
Singh et al. 2006). All of these factors make Wal-Mart a formidable competitor, as evidenced by 
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it being the largest retailer globally, and thus encouraging customer switching at 
disproportionately higher rates and abnormally large drops in customer basket sizes (Ailawadi et 
al. 2010; Singh et al. 2004). For example, incumbent stores experience significant decreases in 
store visits after Wal-Mart’s entry resulting in about 17% of volume or $250,000 in monthly 
revenue (Singh et al. 2004). As Singh et al. (2004, p.1) note: “The rapid growth of alternative 
retail formats has transformed not only the competitive structure of the industry, but also the way 
in which consumers shop. The biggest challenge to the industry is coming from none other than 
the world’s largest retailer: Wal-Mart is cited by supermarket managers as their biggest concern 
in the coming years.”  
As this discussion demonstrates, retail incumbents find it very difficult to compete 
against new Wal-Marts. Their competitive positions are less effective at minimizing sales losses 
from new Wal-Marts than they are from minimizing sales losses from retailers of other formats. 
Retail incumbents will experience customer switching at disproportionately high rates resulting 
in steeper, more persistent sales drops when competing against new Wal-Marts as opposed to 
new specialty stores. Thus:  
H2: The effect of emulating new upscale stores predicted in H1 is greater than 
that of emulating new Wal-Marts. 
 
3.3.2 SSO Moderation Hypotheses 
Characteristics of the trade area may change the nature and/or strength of the SSO-
performance relationship noted above. We focus on the market’s retail density and how the 
physical distance between the incumbent and the new entrant impact this relationship, because 
they have been widely studied in past retail performance research (e.g. Gauri et al. 2009; Hoch et 
al. 1995; Reinartz and Kumar 1999).  
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3.3.2.1 Retail Density. Hotelling (1929) argues that attempts at differentiation are 
matched by competitors in dense retail markets (e.g. Gal-Or and Dukes 2003; Irmen and Thisse 
1998).  For example, if one firm lowers its prices, competitors will respond by slashing their 
prices and a price war will ensue. Subsequent research, however, has shown that this idea of 
minimum differentiation does not always hold in more realistic market settings (e.g. Eaton and 
Lipsey 1975; Economides 1993). For example, Rhee and Bell (2002) find that incumbent 
retailers are best served by differentiating in markets marked by three or more competitors. They 
substantiate this result by arguing that minimizing direct competition and overlap by creating a 
perception of uniqueness and exclusivity are keys to thriving in dense retail markets. Firms with 
relatively few direct competitors are less vulnerable to customer switching and price wars, and 
are generally less vulnerable to competitors. Despite the low switching costs inherent to 
competitive markets, consumers are not motivated to switch if incumbents are perceived as 
unique relative to the new entrant.   
Shepard (1990) adds to this argument by demonstrating that in competitive environments 
the elasticity of demand is considerably higher for branded as opposed to non-branded retailers. 
According to her research, retailers that are perceived as dissimilar (e.g. branded retailers) in 
competitive environments are less susceptible to customer switching and can charge premium 
prices to achieve higher profit margins than competitors. Therefore, in dense retail markets, the 
elasticity of demand will be significantly lower for incumbent retailers that are dissimilar as 
opposed to similar to new entrants. It appears, then, that absent unique features (relative to the 
new entrant), incumbent retailers in competitive markets cannot maintain their customer bases 
and deter customers from switching to new entrants at high rates. 
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Thus, we anticipate that the proposed main effects will be weakened in dense retail 
markets and that the emulators will be particularly susceptible to new entrants in such markets. 
From previous research, it is clear that in dense markets superior performance is driven by (1) 
minimizing direct competition and substitutability and (2) capitalizing on low elasticity of 
demand to charge premium prices by emphasizing differentiation. Because differentiation is 
defined relative to the new entrant, incumbents operating in dense retail markets are best served 
by emphasizing premium services in the face of new Wal-Marts, but should emphasize more 
mainstream services when the new entrant is an upscale store. Recall from our earlier discussion 
that service offering dissimilarity is captured by negative SSO, while similarity is evidenced by 
positive SSO values. So in dense retail markets, incumbents with lower SSO scores will suffer 
significantly smaller sales losses from new entrants than those with higher SSO values. This 
hypothesis is formally presented below:  
H3: Retail density moderates the impact of SSO on retail performance. As the 
number of competitors increases, incumbents that are more unique 
relative to new entrants (i.e., lower SSO values) will outperform their 
peers after new competitor entry. 
 
3.3.2.2 Distance. The impact of location on performance has been widely studied in 
strategy literature. For example, Baum and Haveman’s (1997) research into the Manhattan hotel 
industry indicates that hotels competing for the same clientele experience more intense 
competition than those where the degree of overlap is marginal. They add that a key determinant 
of overlap is distance between competitors. When distance is low, overlap and competitive 
intensity are high (and vice-versa). Thus, hotels can best minimize sales competition losses and 
maximize gains by emphasizing differentiation-based strategies. Creating a perception of 
uniqueness allows firms to serve unique niches and establish sizeable, loyal customer bases.   
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This argument has been supported by other strategy theorists as well. Consider Chung 
and Kalnins (2001), who also study spatial location effects in the hotel industry. Proximate 
retailers benefit from heightened demand and more efficient information acquisition than 
otherwise (Chung and Kalnins 2001).  Key to their work is the finding that proximate 
competitors that are dissimilar outperform those that are similar. These authors believe that 
competitors must differentiate themselves along key dimensions to capture a unique and loyal 
share of the market. Failure to differentiate encourages consumers to be deal prone and ignore 
other evaluative criteria, encourages customer switching, and generally leads to under 
performance (Chung and Kalnins 2001).  
Basically, the most successful retailers emphasize differentiation to minimize 
comparability and substitutability, decrease elasticity of demand, and ultimately increase the 
opportunity costs of switching when competing against proximate entrants. Importantly, we do 
not believe that the proposed main effect completely disappears when distance is considered but 
that it is attenuated such that the optimal SSO measure is lower than otherwise. Since 
differentiation is defined relative to the new entrant, incumbents can best minimize sales losses 
from proximate new discounters by emphasizing premium offerings, but should emphasize more 
mainstream and conventional services when the proximate entrant is an upscale retailer. Building 
from this we argue that differentiation-based incumbents will experience significantly smaller 
sales losses from close new entrants than emulators. This relationship is formally hypothesized 
as:  
H4: Distance moderates the impact of SSO on retail performance. As 
geographic proximity increases, incumbents that are more unique relative 
to new entrants (i.e., lower SSO values) will outperform their peers after 
new competitor entry.  
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3.4 DATA 
 
Our research draws upon four sources to create a dataset consisting of fourteen variables, 
summarized in Table 3. The first of these sources is the Nielsen Homescan data set, which 
provides a complete purchase history for a panel of 2,086 households in three cities — 
Pittsburgh, PA; Cincinnati, OH; and Columbus, OH — between 2005 and 2008. This data set 
also provides demographic information (i.e. household size, household income, and household 
location) about the households in each of these three cities. The households averaged about 2.3 
members, had a median household income of about $42,500, spent approximately $5,000 at 
retailers annually ($35.11 per trip), and shopped 2.74 times each week. We aggregate this 
customer level purchase information up to the store level to better understand how incumbents’ 
competitive positions impact their sales losses from new entrants.  
Second, we use Nielsen’s TD Linx Channel database to gather important industry-level 
information about retail density, store name, and store location. Additionally, by combining the 
household location from the Homescan panel and the store location from TD Linx, we are able to 
calculate distances both from households to stores and from store to store. We then use trade 
publications like Progressive Grocer, Grocery News, and Drugstore News to obtain information 
about store openings and closings as well as additions, expansions, and deletions of services. 
Finally, we use information from the new entrants’ corporate websites to distinguish between 
emulation and differentiation-based services. If a service was found in both the new entrant and 
the incumbent’s store profiles, then it is classified as emulative, but those unique to incumbents 
are viewed as differentiation-based.  
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Table 3.Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Operationalization  Data Source  
Zip Code  The zip code where the store operates TD Linx Database 
Store name Store name  TD Linx Database 
Size The size of the household  Homescan Data 
Income The income of the household  Homescan Data 
Distance Distance between the experimental store and the new store 
opening in miles 
TD Linx Database and 
Homescan Data 
Density The number of retail outlets located within 15 miles of the new 
store  
TD Linx Database 
SSO A measure of the relative emphasis firms place on services 
aimed at emulation as opposed to differentiation 
Trade Publications and 
Corporate Website 
Upscale Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the new store is an 
upscale grocer and -1 otherwise. 
Trade Publications and 
Corporate Website 
Drug Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the incumbent is a 
drugstore and -1 otherwise. 
Trade Publications and 
Corporate Website 
Grocery Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the incumbent is a 
grocery store and -1 otherwise. 
Trade Publications and 
Corporate Website 
Convenience Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the incumbent is a 
convenience store and -1 otherwise. 
Trade Publications and 
Corporate Website 
Delta 
Experimental  
Δ in sales between the quarter before and quarter after the 
opening for the experimental store 
Homescan Data 
Delta Control  Δ in sales between the quarter before and quarter after the 
opening for the control store 
Homescan Data 
Adjusted Sales (Δ in sales between the quarter before and quarter after the 
opening for the experimental store) – (Δ in sales between the 
quarter before and quarter after the opening for corresponding 
control stores 
Homescan Data 
 
We identify store openings by searching trade publications, company websites, and our 
datasets. Next, we identify stores that are located in a geographic area that is close to the store 
opening using their geocodes.  Our analysis defines impacted stores (incumbents) as those within 
fifteen miles of the new store opening and control stores as those within the given trade market 
but more than fifteen miles away from a new store. We use a fifteen mile radius to maintain 
consistency with Ailawadi et al. (2010). Table 4 identifies the new entrants of interest. After 
completing the search for new store openings, and then calculating the distance from the store 
opening to incumbent retailers, we were able to identify 6549 observations to include in our data 
set.  These observations represent data at the individual store level for all stores within fifteen 
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miles of each store opening that is identified in Table 4. The list of potential stores for the data 
set is broad and was obtained from the TD Linx database. 
Table 4.New Entrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Store Type Store Name Location Zip Code Date 
Mass Discounter Wal-Mart Cincinnati, OH 
Metropolis 
45069 
45056 
45036 
45245 
45102 
45240 
45011 
45013 
45040 
45150 
45241 
45239 
45044 
August 24, 2005 
May 18, 2005 
October 26, 2005 
January 25, 2006 
January 31, 2006 
May 8, 2006 
May 8, 2006 
October 11, 2006 
November 3, 2006 
March 5, 2007 
May 4, 2007 
May 21, 2008 
October 10, 2008  
  Columbus, OH 
Metropolis 
43110 
43113 
45601 
43040 
43056 
43123 
43220 
45005 
43016 
January 3, 2005 
May 25, 2005 
May 25, 2005 
March 21, 2006 
October 8, 2006 
January 12, 2007 
January 12, 2007 
April 11, 2007 
Nov 10, 2008 
  Pittsburgh, PA 
Metropolis 
16001 
15904 
16066 
15401 
15065 
January 4, 2005 
January 7, 2005 
March 28, 2007 
February 29, 2008 
March 3, 2008 
Upscale Giant Eagle Market District Pittsburgh, PA 
Metropolis 
15232 
15102 
June 29, 2006 
June 29, 2006 
 Kroger Fresh Fare Cincinnati, OH 
Metropolis 
45236 November 19, 2008 
 The Fresh Market Cincinnati, OH 
Metropolis 
45236 February 23, 2007 
  Columbus, OH 
Metropolis 
43220 January 25, 2005 
 Trader Joe’s Pittsburgh, PA 
Metropolis 
15206 October 2006 
 Whole Foods Columbus, OH 
Metropolis 
43235 July 2006 
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3.5 METHODOLOGY 
 
Like Ailawadi et al. (2010), we test our hypotheses using a naturally occurring quasi-
experiment because our research goals are similar. As they note (p. 16), the effect of a new store 
opening is best conceptualized as “…the difference between ‘before’ and’ ‘after’ for the 
experimental store [incumbent] minus the corresponding before-and-after difference for the 
control.” In our research, experimental stores are incumbents in the trade areas of interest that are 
within fifteen miles of the new entrant, whereas controls are incumbents outside of this fifteen 
mile radius but still in the target market (e.g., Columbus).  
3.5.1 Dependent Variable 
To create our dependent variable, we consider three performance quarters: quarter one 
immediately precedes the new competitor’s entrance, quarter two is when the competitor enters 
the market, and quarter three immediately follows the new entrant’s arrival. In order to determine 
the “difference in differences” we 1) calculate the difference in experimental (incumbent stores 
within a fifteen mile radius of the new entrant) store sales between quarters one and three, 2) 
calculate the difference in corresponding control (incumbent stores in the trade area but outside 
of the fifteen mile radius) store sales between the same periods, and 3) subtract the value 
calculated in step two from that calculated in step one. We label this final value “adjusted sales” 
and use it as our dependent variable. Formally,   
( )                 [                                          ]  [                               ] 
 
Additionally, because firms add and/or delete services on an ongoing basis, we 
recalculate SSO at the beginning of each quarter of our dataset since our dependent variable is 
based on a quarterly measure. Thus, SSO provides a snapshot of a retailer’s competitive position 
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at a given time. As noted earlier, strategic service orientation scores range from -1 to 1, and it has 
a mean of -.057 and a median value of -.122 (For additional statistics refer to Table 5.)  
Table 5.Simple Statistics and Correlation Matrix
3
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3
 We mean centered four continuous variables—household size, household income, distance, density, orientation—
to address collinearity issues. The fifth continuous variable, SSO, was not mean centered.  
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Our dataset is comprised of a relatively heterogeneous sample of incumbent stores. 
Although all of the incumbents have multiple locations and are thus viewed as “big players,” 
they have varying levels of resources. For example, some stores in our sample are concentrated 
in certain regions while others are multinationals. Similarly, some of the incumbents studied are 
franchises and others are corporate-owned. Finally, our research includes incumbents of various 
formats -- convenience, upscale, mass discounters, warehouse clubs, grocery, and drug stores. 
Such heterogeneity is important because it provides a robust test of our results. In addition, Wal-
Mart and Whole Foods serve as both incumbents and new entrants in some markets.    
3.5.2   Control and Independent Variables 
 
To properly assess the effects of our focal variables we include three independent 
variables.  We also include two additional controls, controls which have been shown in past 
research to be important determinants of retail performance. First, we include two controls that 
capture the mean values of household size and income for shoppers at a particular outlet in the 
time period of interest.  These measures are included because they have been found to be 
important determinants of retail success (e.g. Bell et al. 1998; Bell and Lattin 1998), but are not 
our primary focus.  
Our research also considers the effects of three independent variables. The first 
independent variable of interest is retail density. The importance of accounting for the density in 
a given trade area has been made clear by Hotelling (1929) and others (e.g. Economides 1993; 
Irmen and Thisse 1998). The second independent variable considers the impact of distance 
between the incumbent and new entrant. Here again, distance between competitors has been 
shown to be an important determinant of retail performance (e.g. Baum and Haveman’s 1997; 
Chung and Kalnins 2001).  The third and final independent of interest, the “upscale” indicator, 
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allows us to capture the differential effects when the new entrant is an upscale store as opposed 
to a discounter.  Table 6 summarizes the expected effects of the controls, independent variables, 
and the moderators on the dependent performance measure.  
Table 6.Determinants of Incumbent Performance: Hypotheses 
 
3.6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We run our analyses in three steps, adding variables in blocks, with the simpler models 
nested within the more complex ones.  Our baseline model includes the two controls and the 
three independent variable main effects. The second model adds SSO to test the differential 
effectiveness of emulation and differentiation as competitive positions. The third model includes 
interactions between SSO and the independent variables. This final model is:  
( )                                                                    
                                                     
 
Controls Vulnerability to New Wal-
Marts 
Vulnerability to New Upscale Stores 
Household Size ? ? 
Household Income ? ? 
Independent Variables   
Density + + 
Distance  ? ? 
Upscale  N.A. N.A. 
SSO
 
Retail incumbents that have more 
similar service offerings to new 
entrants (i.e., higher SSO values) 
will outperform their peers after 
new competitor entry.  
The effect of emulating new upscale 
stores predicted in H1a is greater than 
that of emulating new Wal-Marts. 
Moderators   
SSO*Density
 
Retail density moderates the impact of SSO on retail performance. As the 
number of competitors increases, incumbents that are more unique relative 
to new entrants (i.e., lower SSO values) will outperform their peers after 
new competitor entry. 
SSO*Distance
 
Distance moderates the impact of SSO on retail performance. As 
geographic proximity increases, incumbents that are more unique relative to 
new entrants (i.e., lower SSO values) will outperform their peers after new 
competitor entry.  
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3.6.1 Model Analysis and Results  
We estimated the models using the weighted least squares procedure in SAS to make sure 
the results were not driven by incumbents of certain formats. For instance, grocery incumbents 
accounted for 44.1% of observations and drugstores accounted for 47.6%, while only 8.3% of 
purchases in our sample were made at grocers. To control for this imbalance, we weighted each 
observation by the inverse of that format’s share of observations.  
The results from our analysis are summarized in Table 7. We report results for all three 
models in Table 7, but focus the following discussion on Model 3. Six variables are statistically 
significant (p < .05) in the final model (Model 3), while a seventh is marginally significant (p 
<.10). We organize our results by first presenting the results of our hypothesis tests, and then 
additional findings.  
Table 7.Estimation Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   *significant at α=.05, +significant at α=.10 
 
3.6.1.1 Hypotheses 1 and 2. Our results show that a positive relationship exists between 
adjusted sales and SSO whereby emulation (as opposed to differentiation) minimizes sales losses 
from new entrants ( ̂ = .105 , p <.001). The results imply that incumbents perceived as unique 
relative to new entrants experience sales losses 1.7% larger than those that offer many of the 
DV= Adjusted Sales 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant .016
+
 .025* .079* 
Household Size .021* .020* .020* 
Household Income -.004
+
 -.003 -.004
+
 
Density  .002* .001* .001 
Distance -.001 -.001 -.001 
Upscale -.016
+
 .025
+
 .050* 
    
SSO  .081* .105*  
    
SSO*Density   -.005* 
SSO*Distance   -.009* 
SSO*Upscale    .081*  
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same services as the new competitor
4
. Interestingly, this effect holds as well when the new 
entrant is an upscale store ( ̂ = .186, p < .0001).5 In this case, differentiators’ sales losses are 
3.41% larger than emulators. Not only does this result indicate that incumbents find it more 
difficult to compete against new Wal-Marts than upscale retailers, but that the value received 
from emulating new upscale stores is greater than that received from emulating new Wal-Marts. 
Thus, emulators outperformed differentiators regardless of the entrant type, providing support for 
both H1 and H2.   
3.6.1.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4: Hypothesis 3 predicts that retail density of the trade area 
moderates the SSO-adjusted sales relationship. Our analysis finds evidence of this relationship 
( ̂ = -.005 , p <.0001). In dense retail markets, incumbents that emphasize emulation (high SSO) 
average sales losses around $190 per $1,000 earned after new competitors enter their markets, 
while those that emphasize differentiation (high SSO) average sales increases around $30 per 
$1,000 earned. To fully understand the implications of these values we scaled them relative to 
the average quarterly sales for the stores in our sample -- $3,601,000. In dense retail markets, 
emulators average quarterly sales losses of $125,576.20 and differentiators experience quarterly 
sales increases of $19,827.82 after new competitor entry.  
This result should not be misinterpreted to suggest that the main SSO-performance 
relationship completely disappears, but instead that it is attenuated in denser markets.  In 
competitive trade areas, incumbents that provide services comparable to new entrants experience 
sales losses 1.4% greater than those that emphasize unique services. Therefore, our results 
support Hypothesis 3.  
                                                          
4
 Odds ratios were calculated by dividing standardized coefficients by average sales for the time period.  
5
 To calculate the correct β value for SSO*Upscale, we added the β for SSO to that of the SSO*Upscale interaction.  
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Consistent with Hypothesis 4, our results show that  distance moderates the relationship 
between SSO and adjusted sales such that differentiation becomes more important as proximity 
increases ( ̂  = -.009 , p >.05); the need to emphasize differentiation (low SSO) increases as 
distance between the incumbent and new entrant decreases. In the case of closely proximate 
competitors, differentiators averaged sales increases around $105.10 per $1,000 earned while 
emulators averaged sales losses around $122.90 per $1,000 earned.  To assess the differential 
effects of emulation and differentiation, we again scaled these values relative to the average 
quarterly sales for incumbents’ in our sample. Scaling these values indicates that in the case of 
proximate competitors, differentiators averaged quarterly sales gains of $69,463.46 while 
emulators averaged quarterly sales losses of $ 81,227.96 after new competitor entry. A 
summary of the findings of the hypotheses tests can be found in Table 8. 
Table 8. Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
 
3.6.1.3 Additional Results: The control variables warrant some discussion. For example, 
the relationship between household size and adjusted sales is positive ( ̂  = .019 , p <.05) 
suggesting that susceptibility to new entrants decreases with household size. We also find that 
household income has a moderately negative relationship with adjusted sales ( ̂  = -.004 , p 
<.10). Firms that attract high income households suffer greater losses from new retailers than 
their peers. Thus, incumbent retailers in high income markets are particularly susceptible to new 
Summary of Hypotheses Supported? 
H1:  Retail incumbents that have more similar service offerings to new entrants (i.e., higher SSO 
values) will outperform their peers after new competitor entry. 
Yes. 
 
H2:  The effect of emulating new upscale stores predicted in H1 is greater than that of emulating new 
Wal-Marts. 
Yes. 
H3:  Retail density moderates the impact of SSO on retail performance. As the number of competitors 
increases, incumbents that are more unique relative to new entrants (i.e., lower SSO values) will 
outperform their peers after new competitor entry. 
Yes. 
H4:  Distance moderates the impact of SSO on retail performance. As geographic proximity 
increases, incumbents that are more unique relative to new entrants (i.e., lower SSO values) will 
outperform their peers after new competitor entry.  
 
Yes.  
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entrants. Importantly, the upscale indicator variable is positively related to the outcome variable 
( ̂  = .050, p <.05), whereby incumbents’ sales losses from new upscale stores are 1.3% smaller 
than those from new entrants of other formats.  
3.6.1.4 What if analysis: To expand the implications of our findings, we recalculated 
Equation 2 for each variable to further examine their impacts on adjusted sales. To conduct this 
“what if” analysis, the value of the upscale indicator was set to one and the values of the 
continuous variables (distance and density) were increased by one standard deviation above their 
grand means; the other variables were set to their grand means. Results from this analysis are 
summarized in Table 9. After we controlled for the control and independent variables, and the 
interaction effects the baseline adjusted sales was .04.  
Table 9. Summary of “What If” Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Note: These values show the range of adjusted sales when the specific factors are increased or decreased. 
 
Household size exhibits the strongest effect among the control variables, increasing 
adjusted sales to .060 or a 48.4% increase from the baseline level. Comparatively, the associated 
change in household income results in a 47% change in adjusted sales from its baseline. Of the 
independent variables studied SSO has the largest effect on adjusted sales, increasing adjusted 
Variable (SD if Continuous) DV= Adjusted Sales 
Baseline: intercept only .04 
Controls  
Household Size .021, .060 
Household Income .060, .021 
Independents   
Upscale .048, .098 
Density .024, .056 
Distance  .044, .036 
SSO -.06, .02 
Moderators  
SSO*Upscale -.026, .107 
SSO*Density .171, -.090 
SSO*Distance .010, -.019 
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sales 76% above its baseline while the upscale indicator results in a 66% jump from the baseline. 
The associated change in density is 40.7%, while that for distance is equivalent to a 9.6 % 
change. Importantly, adjusted sales increases from .04 to .107 when all predictors except SSO 
are held constant, resulting in a 164% change from the baseline.  
When the other variables are controlled for SSO*upscale interaction has a larger effect on 
adjusted sales than the other interactions. Increasing the coefficient of this interaction to .216 
produces a 435% change in adjusted sales from the baseline level. For the SSO*Density 
interaction adjusted sales changed about 323% from the baseline but about 147% for the 
corresponding change in the SSO*distance interaction. 
3.6.2 Incumbent Format Analysis  
In addition to our overall analysis, we also estimated Model 2 separately for incumbents 
of different formats. Specifically, we seek to understand if competitive positions are 
differentially effective for drug, mass discounter, and grocery incumbents. Per Table B1, the key 
relationships for drug store incumbents are largely consistent with the main analysis. As before, 
emulation is optimal when competing against new Wal-Marts and upscale stores ( ̂ = .076 , 
p<.05), though this effect is particularly strong when the entering store is an upscale grocer ( ̂ = 
.24 , p<.0001).  And although the SSO * Density interaction is significant in the expected 
direction ( ̂ = -.004 , p<.0001), the SSO * Distance interaction is not ( ̂ = <-.001 , p=.867). For 
example, drugstores are best served by emulating new entrants when there are fewer than 
seventeen competitors  in the market, but differentiation is a better option otherwise. In this study 
11.2% of drugstore incumbents serve markets with fewer than seventeen competitors. Some of 
the effects reported in the primary analysis also hold when the incumbent is a grocer (refer to 
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Table B2). These results indicate that none of the competitive positions studied are uniformly 
effective for grocery incumbents.  
Emulation-based grocers experience significantly smaller sales losses from new entrants 
as an aggregate than differentiators ( ̂ = .026 , p<.05). Although the SSO * Upscale interaction 
appears to be significant ( ̂ = -.023 , p<.05), this effect is practically nonexistent when the main 
effect is considered. So for incumbent grocers, emulation is optimal when competing against 
new Wal-Marts but none of the competitive orientations drives superior performance when the 
new competitor is an upscale retailer. Importantly, neither distance nor density moderates the 
SSO-performance relationship when the incumbent is a grocer.  
The final incumbent format of interest is the mass discounter. Results from this analysis 
can be found in Table B3. As this table suggests, emulation and differentiation are equally 
ineffective in shielding discounters from Wal-Marts ( ̂ = .003 , ns-).  In contrast to the primary 
analysis, mass discounters can defend against new upscale entrants by emphasizing 
differentiation over emulation ( ̂ = -.013 , p<.05). Thus, discount incumbents are best served by 
differentiating when the new entrant is an upscale retailer but cannot leverage either competitive 
position studied to minimize the effects of new discounters.  
3.6.3 Robustness Check 
 
In line with Mizik and Jacobson (2003), we tested an alternative specification of SSO. Of 
particular interest to us is understanding if our results hold when the emulation-differentiation 
differential is captured as a percentage. We operationalized SSO as percent emulation, by 
subtracting the number of differentiation-based services from the total number of services and 
dividing this value by the total number of services. These results (Appendix C Table C1) are 
largely consistent with those presented. For instance, in both cases we find support of the main 
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effect of SSO and find that an emulation-based position best minimizes incumbents’ sales losses 
from new entrants—new Wal-Marts and new upscale stores. And like the main analysis, this 
robustness check suggests that retail density and distance attenuate the main effect of SSO; the 
need to emphasize differentiation over emulation increases with retail density and distance 
between the competitors. We, however, believe the results presented are stronger and more 
reliable because the way we operationalize SSO is rooted in Mizik and Jacobson (2003). 
3.7 DISCUSSION  
Retail performance is becoming increasingly competitive.  Not only are retailers facing 
increasing pressures from retail chains and big box stores, but they are also facing increasing 
disintermediation. These factors have forced many retailers into bankruptcy and made it difficult 
for many others to remain profitable. Taken together, the results from our research provide 
important theoretical insights into how retail advantages are created and sustained. Through our 
research we demonstrate that retail advantage is driven by an understanding of how one’s 
competitive position vis-à-vis a new entrant’s impacts their ability to compete. Failure to 
recognize the risks associated with competing against different types of new entrants not only 
exposes incumbents to extraordinary risks, but exacerbates sales losses as well. Importantly, the 
value of one’s competitive position depends on retail density.  
In addition, retail incumbents must recognize when their competitive positions are 
insufficient and in themselves cannot insulate them from new retailers. In such cases incumbents 
must emphasize low pricing, assortment quality, customer service initiatives, cleanliness, 
shopping environment, food services, and other programs that have been proven through our 
others’ research (e.g. Ailawadi et al. 2010; Arnold et al. 1983) to support retail advantages. 
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Managing this dynamic not only leads to investment efficiencies, but results in more productive 
resource deployment, superior performance, and competitive advantage.  
3.7.1 Managerial Implications 
Using SSO as a proxy for firm competitive position, we study the differential 
effectiveness of emulation and differentiation. Of particular interest to us is determining which 
competitive position minimizes incumbents’ sales losses from new entrants. We show that an 
emulation-based position is superior to differentiation when competing against new entrants; 
failure to match the entrant’s offering highlights deficiencies in the incumbent’s strategy and 
ultimately encourages consumer switching at a high rate.    
The SSO-performance relationship is amplified when the new entrant is a Wal-Mart. We 
find that the effect of emulating new upscale stores tends to be stronger than the value received 
from emulating new Wal-Marts. This result is interesting in that emulating an upscale grocer 
may mean having different services than emulating Wal-Mart. We are not suggesting that firms 
invest in an entirely new set of services each time a competitor opens, but that incumbents 
highlight particular services when a competitor of a certain type arrives. For example, if a new 
Whole Foods is opening, an existing store could feature its demonstration stations in their 
marketing activities to emphasize the quality of their food.  
Although our results show that emulation is superior to differentiation in an absolute 
sense, the importance of differentiation increases with competitive intensity. This result implies 
that the need to stand out overtakes the power of being a first-mover in an area. We specifically 
find that the SSO-performance relationship flips in favor of differentiation when there are at least 
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twenty-one competitors in a trade area6. Thus, retailers should assess the competitive nature of 
trading areas before deciding how to approach a new competitive threat.  In the same sense, retail 
incumbents must understand how distance from the new entrant impacts their ability to compete. 
Competitors within twelve miles of the new entrant should emphasize emulation, but those 
outside of this radius are best served by operating unique competitive positions.   
We also estimate models to understand how the competitive positions work across 
different retail formats. Such a micro-level approach is particularly important because it allows 
us to provide retail managers with more specific strategic direction than otherwise. These 
analyses make clear that vulnerability to new entrants is not uniform but instead depends on 
characteristics of the incumbent and characteristics of the new entrant. Emulating is optimal for 
drug incumbents regardless of the new entrant (the new entrant can be a Wal-Mart or upscale 
retailer). And although emulation best minimizes grocers’ sales losses from new Wal-Marts, 
differentiation is important when the new entrant is an upscale store. Finally, differentiation and 
emulation are equally ineffective at insulating discounters from new Wal-Marts while these 
incumbents should emphasize differentiation in the face of new upscale stores.  
In addition, our research offers a strong test of the differential effectiveness of the 
competitive positions identified by Porter (1980, 1998). Our predecessors like Ailawadi et al. 
(2010) study the marketing mix as an aggregate but our research strictly focuses on service 
offerings. They also look at strategic reaction, while we seek to understand how incumbents’ 
existing strategies impact sales losses. Thus, though firms may be able to react to new 
incumbents, its existing strategy may also be important. For example, it is unreasonable to expect 
that Whole Foods will reposition itself as a value retailer once a new Wal-Mart arrives.  
                                                          
6
 In our sample 6036 of the 6,549 or 92% observations were in markets with at least twenty-one competitors in their 
markets. 
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Also, we study entry by new upscale stores, which no other researcher has done. Adding 
this dimension allows us to offer a more comprehensive explanation of retail competition than 
our predecessors.  Arguably our most important contribution is our finding that incumbents and 
new entrants’ formats impact one’s ability to compete and the way one should compete. An 
appreciation of this dynamic is needed to remain viable in an increasingly brutal retail 
environment.   
4.0 CONCLUSION 
 
 My dissertation extends the literature on retail competition by explaining how retail 
advantage is built (Essay I) and how service overlap impacts an incumbent's ability to withstand 
competitive threats from new entrants (Essay II).  My first essay provides retail managers with 
novel and actionable insights by explaining the consequences of their resource deployment 
decisions and explicating how sustained retail advantage is built. I identify the twelve sources of 
retail advantage and communicate the need to understand the differential importance of 
capabilities. Most importantly, I find that sustained retail advantage is driven by deploying 
systems of interrelated capabilities, rather than capabilities that do not reinforce one another. Not 
only do I identify four fundamental systems of interrelated capabilities but I explain how they 
work.  
 Despite its contributions, this paper leaves many questions unanswered—questions that 
can be answered through additional empirical and conceptual research. Empirically, research is 
needed to test and validate the propositions presented in this paper while conceptual research is 
needed to identify the sources of competitive advantage in other industries. For instance, what 
drives superior performance in business-to-business and online contexts? How are these drivers 
similar to (different from) those in the retail industry? How can firms integrate competitive 
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drivers across these contexts to maximize efficiency and performance? Answering these 
questions is important because many firms operate across various business contexts.  
 Although I identify basic retail systems, additional work is needed to fully understand 
how systems (rather than individual capabilities) promote sustained competitive advantage. This 
can be done by expanding my sample to gain a better understanding of retail leaders’ best 
practices. In addition, research must identify higher order retail systems to explain how primary 
capabilities interact with one another. This research should also answer the following questions: 
are the primary capabilities equally important, should the emphasis placed on primary 
capabilities change with market conditions, and does a certain primary capability underlie all 
firm activities and serve as the core of firm success?  
Finally, further examination of the processes underlying competitive advantage is needed. 
Through my research I learned that the collection of resources across firms is relatively 
homogeneous, but competitive differentiation is most often achieved by the ways firms manage 
and deploy these resources. It appears that in many cases processes drive sustained competitive 
advantage. Research is therefore needed to identify and understand the processes firms use to 
convert their resources into sources of sustained competitive advantage. For example, firms may 
be most successful by focusing on one or two systems instead of all of them. Even still, 
capabilities in systems may deserve differing degrees of weight given market conditions; 
managing systems may require that firms periodically reassess the component capabilities and 
the value assigned to each of these components. Again, I believe these processes may differ 
across business contexts.  
 My second essay demonstrates that incumbent retailers can leverage their service 
offerings in the form of a competitive position--emulation or differentiation--to minimize sales 
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losses from new entrants. Importantly, however, none of the competitive positions is uniformly 
superior. Instead, their effectiveness is largely a function of characteristics of the trade area and 
the incumbent’s position vis-à-vis the new entrant’s. Failure to appreciate this dynamic and 
operate the correct competitive position not only exacerbates sales losses due to new entrants, 
but leads to under performance and ultimately competitive disadvantage. 
 While this essay offers novel insights into the insulating role of strategic orientation on 
sales losses stemming from competitive entry, there remains much to be learned about retail 
competitors' interactions. I discuss five key limitations and opportunities for future research 
related to this paper. First, my sample only includes three cities facing fairly similar economic 
market conditions. Future research should study whether there are differences from our results 
when more diverse geographic and economic conditions are included. For instance, Lamey et al. 
(2007) have shown that business cycles in part explain the success of marketing programs. Thus, 
one would expect the SSO-performance relationship to change with fluctuations in business 
cycles as well.   
 Second, this paper looks at the ancillary services a retailer has in place at the time a new 
competitor opens. However, I do not study the dynamic nature of competition to see whether 
retailers alter their service offerings in response to the competitor opening and if so which 
response (emulation or differentiation) is the best. Even still, is it better for retail incumbents to 
maintain their strategic positions or change their positions in response to new entrants? It is also 
worth studying if SSO works similarly in the online context or if the importance of one’s 
orientation less important in this channel? Understanding the role of competitive positioning in 
the online context is particularly important as consumers are increasingly patronizing online 
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shops (Zhou et al. 2007). Finally, work must be done to understand which product categories and 
departments are most (least) susceptible to competitors.  
 Third, in the tradition of extant research, my second essay studies how retailers can 
minimize sales losses from new entrants (e.g. Gielens et al. 2008, Ailawadi et al. 2010). 
However, none of this research studies retail competition from the new entrant’s perspective. For 
example, do the most successful new entrants overlap with incumbents or are they perceived as 
unique relative to established competitors? Answering these questions will not only provide 
retailers insights as they expand, but a more comprehensive understanding of retail competition.  
 Fourth, I recognize that other factors influence consumers’ likelihood of switching to new 
entrants (e.g. company and product characteristics, retail brand equity, macroeconomic 
conditions, and other contextual factors). So, additional research is needed to explain how these 
factions impact the SSO-adjusted sales relationship.  
 Finally, more research must be done to explain differences across retail formats. This 
research sets the stage for such research by demonstrating that differences do in fact exist, but 
more work must be done to flesh out these differences, explain why they exist, and fully explain 
how these differences impact retail competition. Is it that consumers view certain retail formats 
as substitutes for one another and others as complements? Or do these differences exist because 
consumers are motivated to shop at retail formats for different reasons (i.e. consumers may 
primarily make small basket purchases at drugstores but may make destination trips to mass 
discounters and grocery stores)?  
 Following my suggested course of research will not only improve theoretical 
understandings of competitive advantage, but provide managers with unparalleled insights as 
they develop resources. Providing retailers with such guidance is especially important as they 
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find it increasingly difficult to compete (Basker 2007, Jia 2006, Neumann 2005, and Neumann 
2008). It is hoped that my dissertation serves as a basis for additional research into retail 
competition. 
  
82 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 Appendix A includes the protocols used in this research. The first protocol was 
administered to retail managers, while the second was administered to home improvement 
managers. These protocols are highly similar, but at time reflect sector specific trends and 
qualities.  
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RETAIL PROTOCOL 
Section 1 
1. What factors not covered in our framework do you think impacts retailers’ performance? 
2. What makes apparel firms successful over time? 
3. Do you think the key performance drivers are the same within the retail industry? For 
instance, do you think these drivers are the same between apparel and home improvement 
retailers? Please explain. 
 
4. In your opinion, is your firm the industry leader in any of the areas identified in question 
5? Please explain. 
 
5. Does your firm excel in all of the areas identified in question 5?  
a. If not, which functions does your firm perform extremely well (extremely 
poorly)?  
6. Have some capabilities transitioned from being firm-specific to being industry-standards? 
Please explain. 
7. Thus far we (and other authors) have assumed that a firm’s resources immediately impact 
its performance. Is it that the impact of some of these capabilities is not obvious on a 
balance sheet or there’s a lagged effect associated with some of these investments?  
8. Although retail firms have heavily invested in IT skills, they continue to dedicate a bulk 
of resources to this capability. Comparatively, our research indicates that the other 
capabilities have not received such consistently large amounts of investment. Why do 
you think this investment differential exists? In your opinion, does the value achieved 
from IT investments decay at a faster rate than that received from investments in other 
capabilities? 
9. It appears that having superior IT skills is important because this resource can strengthen 
the performance impact of other resources. For instance, superior IT skills increase the 
impact distribution & logistics has on performance. It also seems that superior IT skills 
improve the customer service and property management initiatives.  
a. First, is our interpretation correct? 
b. Second, are there other resources in our framework with such a breadth of 
impact? 
c. What are other examples of interrelated capabilities? 
Section 2 
10. In your opinion which of the following is a more valuable strategy: 
a. heavily investing in key drivers of success and marginally investing in minor 
drivers 
b. heavily investing in minor drivers of success and marginally investing in key 
drivers  
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c. equally investing in minor and key components of success   
11. Imagine there are 10 companies in the apparel industry competing in 10 areas of 
competitive advantage. Company X leads the industry in four of these areas, but is 
severely disadvantaged in the remaining 6. While Company Y does not lead the industry 
in any of these areas, but ranks among the top three firms in each of these areas. In your 
opinion, is it more sustainable to be company X or Company Y? Please substantiate your 
decision.  
12. Wal-Mart is known for its cross-docking resource. Although many firms have attempted 
to copy this capability, they have largely been unable to receive comparable benefits 
because this resource is linked to intangible processes (i.e. employee know-how) that are 
not easily transferred between companies. Like Wal-Mart’s cross-docking, are any of the 
performance drivers identified in our research linked to intangible processes that cannot 
be easily transferred between firms? If so, please explain. 
a. Is it that primary as opposed to secondary capabilities are linked to intangible 
processes? 
13. It is generally believed that continuously investing in resources will increase its 
productivity. Is this assumption correct or do some resources have upper-limits where 
they cease to add value? For instance, is there but so much value you can extract from 
superior property management, IT skills, etc.? Please explain. 
14. It appears that the performance drivers we identify generally focus on static as opposed to 
dynamic processes.  
a. Is this interpretation correct? 
b. In your opinion, is a dynamic mentality necessary to be competitive in the home 
improvement industry?  
Section 3  
15. Our research indicates that retailers do not operate an overall brand strategy, but instead 
manage brands at individual levels. Per this strategy, firms ignore the other facets of 
brand management and specifically ignore the need to uniquely position each brand and 
subsequently maximize profits associated with each. 
a. Is this interpretation correct? 
b. If so, which is a more important facet of brand management partnering with a lot 
of brands or maximizing value of a few brands? 
c. And which is a more important driver of firm performance—breadth of brands 
offered or depth of products offered in each brand?  
16. Per our research, it appears that all retailers uniformly value high levels of customer 
service and as such consistently invest in this capability. Because of this it appears there’s 
relatively little difference between apparel firms’ customer service levels and thus this 
capability is not a competitive differentiator.  
a. Is this interpretation correct? Please explain. 
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b. If “yes” are there other such capabilities?  
17. It appears that creating a novel shopping experience is only valuable to high-tier apparel 
firms like Macy’s and Nordstrom’s. Is this interpretation correct? 
a. If so, how can we reconcile this with the fact that providing a high-level of 
customer service is uniformly valued by firms of all quality levels as these 
capabilities appear to be interconnected?  
18. Is it true that firms sometimes cede capabilities, where ceding is defined as a firm’s 
decision to yield a competitive advantage in a specific area? 
19. Our research indicates that market sensing and inter-functional partnerships receive 
relatively little investment. Is this interpretation correct? If so (if not) please explain.  
20. The ability to manage mergers & acquisitions became evident during our review of the 
home improvement industry, but its importance was solidified during our study of the 
apparel industry. This capability appears important because it provides an efficient means 
of expansion, but also exposes firms to duplication and cannibalization risks. Thus, firms 
that can balance this reward-risk premium will outperform others. 
a. In your opinion is our interpretation of this capability correct?  
21. One factor that our preliminary research ignored is a firm’s ability to divest in 
unprofitable ventures, a capability we refer to as acquisition divestment. In your opinion 
is capability valuable? 
a. In particular is superior acquisition divestment an important performance driver? 
b. And if so, can this driver lead to a sustained competitive advantage?    
22. Is there a market identification component of market sensing? Specifically, is JCPenney 
(Nordstrom’s) better able to identify the needs of middle-class (upper-class) as opposed 
to upper-class (middle-class) customers?  
23. Are there examples where market factors have shifted emphasis from one capability to 
another? Please explain.  
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HOME IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL 
 
Section1 
1. What factors not covered in our framework do you think impacts retailers’ performance?  
2. What makes home improvement firms successful over time? 
3. Do you think the key performance drivers are the same across industries? Please explain.  
4. Do you think the key performance drivers are the same within the retail industry? For 
instance, do you think these drivers are the same between apparel and home improvement 
retailers? Please explain. 
5. What do you see as the key performance drivers in the home improvement industry? 
6. In your opinion, is your firm the industry leader in any of the areas identified in question 
3? Please explain. 
7. Does your firm excel in all of the areas identified in question 3?  
a. If not, which functions does your firm perform extremely well (extremely 
poorly)?  
8. Have some capabilities transitioned from being firm-specific to being industry-standards? 
Please explain. 
9. Thus far we (and other authors) have assumed that a firm’s resources immediately impact 
its performance. Is it that the impact of some of these capabilities is not obvious on a 
balance sheet or there’s a lagged effect associated with some of these investments?  
10. Although retail firms have heavily invested in IT skills, they continue to dedicate a bulk 
of resources to this capability. Comparatively, our research indicates that the other 
capabilities have not received such consistently large amounts of investment. Why do 
you think this investment differential exists? In your opinion, does the value achieved 
from IT investments decay at a faster rate than that received from investments in other 
capabilities? 
a. Are there other capabilities where such a decay effect exists?  
11. It appears that having superior IT skills is important because this resource can strengthen 
the performance impact of other resources. For instance, superior IT skills increase the 
impact distribution & logistics has on performance. It also seems that superior IT skills 
improve the customer service and property management initiatives.  
a. First, is our interpretation correct? 
b. Second, are there other resources in our framework with such a breadth of 
impact? 
Section2  
12. In your opinion which of the following is a more valuable strategy: 
a. heavily investing in key drivers of success and marginally investing in minor 
drivers 
b. heavily investing in minor drivers of success and marginally investing in key 
drivers  
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c. equally investing in minor and key components of success   
Please explain the logic behind your choice.  
13. Imagine there are 10 companies in the Home Improvement Industry competing on 10 
distinct sources of competitive advantage. Company X leads the industry in four of these 
areas, but is severely disadvantaged in the remaining 6. While Company Y does not lead 
the industry in any of these areas, but ranks among the top three firms in each of these 
areas. In your opinion, is it more sustainable to be company X or Company Y. Please 
substantiate your decision.  
14. Wal-Mart is known for its cross-docking resource. Although many firms have attempted 
to copy this capability, they have largely been unable to receive comparable benefits 
because this resource is linked to intangible processes (i.e. employee know-how) that are 
not easily transferred between companies. Like Wal-Mart’s cross-docking, are any of the 
performance drivers identified in our research linked to intangible processes that cannot 
be easily transferred between firms? If so, please explain.  
a. Is it that primary as opposed to secondary capabilities are linked to intangible 
processes? 
15. It is generally believed that continuously investing in resources will increase their 
productivity. Is this assumption correct or do some resources have upper-limits where 
they cease to add value? For instance, is there but so much value you can extract from 
superior property management, IT skills, etc.? Please explain.  
16. It appears that the performance drivers we identify—IT skills, property management, 
customer service, market sensing, novel shopping experience, buying ability, 
international emphasis, inter—functional partnerships, price-value relationship, brand 
management, distribution & logistics—generally focus on static as opposed to dynamic 
processes.  
a. Is this interpretation correct? 
b. In your opinion, is a dynamic mentality necessary to be competitive in the home 
improvement industry?  
Section 3  
17. Our research indicates that retailers do not operate an overall brand strategy, but instead 
manage brands at individual levels. Per this strategy, firms ignore the other facets of 
brand management and specifically ignore the need to uniquely position each brand and 
subsequently maximize profits associated with each. 
a. Is this interpretation correct? 
a. If so, which is a more important facet of brand management partnering with a lot 
of brands or maximizing value of a few brands? 
b. And which is a more important driver of firm performance—breadth of brands 
offered or depth of products offered in each brand?  
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18. Per our research, it appears that all retailers uniformly value high levels of customer 
service and as such consistently invest in this capability. Because of this it appears there’s 
relatively little difference between apparel firms’ customer service levels and thus this 
capability is not a competitive differentiator.  
a. Is this interpretation correct? Please explain. 
b. If “yes” are there other such capabilities?  
19. While customer service (a component of customer-centric strategies) is of primary 
importance to firms, other customer-centric initiatives like balancing the price-value 
relationship and incorporating a novel shopping experience are minimally important. 
Instead factors like efficient distribution & logistics, superior IT skills, and efficiency as a 
whole appear to be more important performance drivers. With that said have researchers 
failed to articulate the interconnectedness of customer-centric strategies and efficiency-
oriented strategies, are practitioners incorrectly applying the market orientation strategy, 
or have practitioners adopted alternate strategies? 
20. Is it true that firms sometimes cede capabilities, where ceding is defined as a firm’s 
decision to yield a competitive advantage in a specific area? 
a. In your opinion must firms recognize areas where they are competitively 
disadvantaged and subsequently cede advantage in this area in order to remain 
competitive at an aggregate level? 
b. In your opinion, can firms remain competitive after ceding key performance 
drivers? 
c. In your opinion, can firms remain competitive after ceding minor performance 
drivers?  
21. Have Lowe’s & HD’s investment in supply chain & logistics initiatives increased over 
the past few years? Or is this perception a function of the availability of information? 
a. IF so, how have external market factors impacted the shift towards this 
capability? More specifically, this capability did not appear to be a primary driver 
of firm performance in the beginning of the century though it now appears to be 
of primary of importance.  
b. Are there other examples where market factors have shifted emphasis from one 
capability to another?  
22. Our research indicates that market sensing and inter-functional partnerships receive 
relatively little investment. Is this interpretation correct? If so (if not) please explain.  
23. One factor that our preliminary research ignored is a firm’s ability to divest in 
unprofitable ventures, a capability we refer to as acquisition divestment. In your opinion 
is capability valuable? 
a. In particular is superior acquisition divestment an important performance driver? 
b. And if so, can this driver lead to a sustained competitive advantage?    
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24. Is there a market identification component of market sensing? Specifically, is HD 
(Lowe’s) better able to identify the needs of DIY (DIFM) as opposed to DIFM (DIY) 
customers?  
25. DIFM customers tend to be older and have higher salaries, while DIY customers tend to 
be younger and from poorer backgrounds. Based on this it’s expected that as DIY 
customers transition to being older and become more ingrained in their careers they’ll 
shift to being DIFM customers and subsequently switch to Lowe’s. Is such a supposition 
realistic? More specifically, will these DIY customers remain loyal to Home Depot or 
not? 
a. In your opinion are strategies targeted at DIFM or DIY segments sustainable?    
26. Research suggests that neither Lowe’s nor HD is directly involved in innovative 
practices. Is this interpretation correct?  
a. If yes, is such a hands-off approach sustainable?  
b. If Sears, the 3rd ranked home improvement firm, aggressively invests in 
innovation do you think this will threaten HD/Lowe’s stronghold? Please explain.  
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APPENDIX B 
 Appendix B includes tables that summarize the results of the supplementary analyses and 
correlation matrices for different retail formats. To note, we mean centered four continuous 
variables—household size, household income, distance, density, orientation—to address 
collinearity issues. The fifth continuous variable, SSO, was not mean centered. 
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TABLE B1 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR DRUGSTORES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*significant at α=.05, +significant at α=.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV=Adjusted Sales for Drugstores 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -.015
+
 -.010 .082* 
Household Size .013 .012 .012 
Household Income -.007* -.006* -.007* 
Density .001* .001* <.001 
Distance .004* .004* .004 
Upscale -.002 .013 .059* 
    
SSO  .032 .076* 
    
SSO*Density   -.004* 
SSO*Distance   -.006 
SSO*Upscale    .164* 
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TABLE B2 
SIMPLE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX-DRUGSTORE INCUMBENTS 
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TABLE B3 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR GROCERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           *significant at α=.05, +significant at α=.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV=Adjusted Sales for Grocers 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -.025* -.021* -.031* 
Household Size .010* .010* .009* 
Household Income -.001 -.001 -.001 
Density .008* .007 .001* 
Distance .003* .003* .003* 
Upscale -.001 .013* .009 
    
SSO  .031* .026* 
    
SSO*Density   <-.001 
SSO*Distance   -.002 
SSO*Upscale    -.023* 
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TABLE B4 
SIMPLE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX-GROCER INCUMBENTS 
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TABLE B5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR MASS DISCOUNTERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
                             *significant at α=.05, +significant at α=.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV=Adjusted Sales for Mass Discounters 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant .011* .012* .006* 
Household Size .001 .001 .001 
Household Income .001
+
 .001
+
 .001
+
 
Density <.001 <.001 <.001 
Distance -.002* -.002* -.002* 
Upscale -.003* <-.001 -.004 
    
SSO  .005 .003 
    
SSO*Density   -.003
+
 
SSO*Distance   -.002* 
SSO*Upscale    -.013* 
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TABLE B6 
SIMPLE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX- MASS DISCOUNT INCUMBENTS 
 
S
S
O
*
 
D
e
n
sity
 
S
S
O
*
 
D
ista
n
ce 
S
S
O
*
 
U
p
sca
le 
S
S
O
 
D
e
n
sity
 
D
ista
n
ce 
U
p
sca
le 
In
c
o
m
e 
 S
ize 
V
a
r
ia
b
le 
5
.9
8
4
 
1
.7
4
2
 
-.5
6
3
 
.1
3
4
 
4
6
.4
5
 
8
.9
0
8
 
-.3
4
1
 
2
1
.7
6
 
2
.6
5
6
  
M
e
a
n
 
5
.1
9
4
 
7
.3
3
2
 
.1
3
5
 
.5
6
3
 
4
.9
2
9
 
3
.9
0
6
 
.9
4
1
 
2
.9
4
9
 
.9
1
4
 
    
S
td
. 
D
e
v
ia
tio
n
 
        1 
S
iz
e 
      - 1 
.5
0
6
 
In
c
o
m
e 
      1 
-.0
8
9
 
-.9
7
7
 
U
p
sca
le 
     1 
-.0
3
3
 
-.1
6
0
 
-.0
9
2
 
D
ista
n
ce 
    1 
.0
4
3
 
-.0
0
1
 
-.0
8
2
 
.3
8
6
 
D
e
n
sity
 
   1 
.0
0
4
 
.0
5
2
. 
-.9
7
7
 
-.0
5
9
 
.0
7
5
 
 
S
S
O
 
  1 
.6
3
6
 
<
-.0
0
1
 
.0
9
7
 
-.4
5
6
 
-.0
9
6
 
-.0
0
5
 
S
S
O
*
 
U
p
sca
le 
 1 
.6
3
6
 
1
 
.0
0
4
 
.0
5
2
 
-.9
7
7
 
-.0
5
9
 
.0
7
5
 
S
S
O
*
 
D
ista
n
ce 
1
 
1
 
.6
3
6
 
1
 
.0
0
4
 
.0
5
2
 
-.9
7
7
 
-.0
5
9
 
.0
7
5
 
S
S
O
*
 
D
e
n
sity
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
APPENDIX C 
 Appendix C includes tables that contain the results of the robustness checks using an 
alternative operationalization of SSO.  
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TABLE C1 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS PERCENT EMULATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
*significant at α=.05, +significant at α=.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV= Adjusted Sales 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant .016* -.056* -.026 
Household Size .021* .020* .020* 
Household Income -.004
+
 -.003 -.004
+
 
Density .002* .002* .006* 
Distance -.001 -.001 .007 
Upscale -.016* .025 -.031 
    
SSO  .161* .692* 
    
SSO*Density   -.011* 
SSO*Distance   -.017* 
SSO*Upscale    -.011* 
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